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It is well understood that scal policy has important implications for many of the most fundamental
economic outcome variables, including rms’ main short- and long-run business decisions, the shape
of the labor market, and household income in more general (see for example Kneller et al., 1999, among
many others in this context). While not always in the spotlight of the public attention, scal policy
at the sub-national and local level is by no means less important than decisions made at the national
level. In fact, through local tax policies and spending decisions local governments do not only manage
the provision of numerous services that are nearest to our day-to-day lives – including the quality
of local road infrastructure and other services, the degree of public safety, educational opportunities,
and many more – but also shape the local business environment for rms to invest and hire, or not.
Navigating the increasingly complex crosscurrents of local governments’ budgets has become an ever
more challenging, yet essential, duty of local policy makers. Local administrations nd themselves
between the sometimes conicting priorities of political, economic, social, and legal considerations, to
name just a few. For example, political and institutional constraints, such as budget balance rules, might
require governments to take unpopular decisions such as tax increases in order to increase their scal
space in the longer run, but can easily stoke discontent and fury among aected citizens.
This thesis studies the determinants and implications of scal policies with a particular focus on
sub-national and local tax and spending decisions. It consists of four self-contained chapters that cover
dierent aspects in this context. The rst two chapters are related to the determinants of scal pol-
icy. While Chapter 1 is investigating the (sometimes unintended) consequences of national and supra-
national scal rules for government budget decits, Chaper 2 is looking at exogenous revenue shocks,
both positive and negative ones, and how German states adjust their budgets in response. The last
two chapters focus on the implications of local scal policies for citizens and rms. Chapter 3 analyzes
how the quality of local public good provision varies across English neighborhoods, how it compares
with local spending levels and to what extent dierences in the quality aect re-election chances of
incumbent neighborhood councilors. Lastly, Chapter 4 is turning to the question how tax policy at the
municipality-level aects rms’ decisions, and in particular their willingness to report prots and pay
taxes there.
Chapter 1 of this thesis, which is joint work with Francesca Caselli and Philippe Wingender, is in-
vestigating the eects of budget balance rules on governments’ decits. Despite being a frequently used
instrument at various levels of government in the EU, in African and Asian countries, and elsewhere,
the empirical evidence on its eectiveness in constraining the budget balance is scarce and surprisingly
ambiguous. While a couple of authors claim to see a positive eect of rule adoption, Heinemann et al.
(2018) in a meta-study analysis point to “strong evidence for the presence of endogeneity and the rele-
vance of accounting for it”. For example, countries that have adopted a decit rule could have a stronger
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preference for scal prudence anyway, even in the absence of the rule. The authors conclude on a more
pessimistic note, arguing that properly addressing endogeneity concerns “signicantly weakens the
seemingly optimistic message with respect to the eectiveness of scal rules”. Apart from endogeneity
issues, existing studies have also made little eort to uncover dierences in the size of the treatment
eect across countries and over time, and identify potentially important layers of heterogeneity which
could also be, at least partially, responsible for the ambiguous empirical ndings so far.
In this study, we look behind and around the average treatment eect of budget balance rules. By
carefully applying the Synthetic Control Method of Abadie et al. (2010), we identify the country-specic
impact of the rule and follow thereby closely the advances in the program evaluation literature which
has been emphasizing the importance of tracing out the whole distribution of treatment eects (see in
particular Heckman et al., 1997, on this issue). Our results do lend support to the hypothesis that coun-
tries respond very dierently to the introduction of budget balance rules. Two margins of dierences
across countries are particularly important: rst, the counter-factual scal balance in absence of the
scal rule. We show that those countries which would have had large decits in absence of the rule
see their balance improve most while countries with smaller decits, or even budget surpluses, reduce
their scal eorts. Thus, taken together, the introduction of the scal rule exerts a ‘magnet eect’ on
budget balances in the sense that the tails of the counter-factual decit distribution are pulled towards
the center of it which is determined by the numerical value of the scal rule. The second important
determinant of the success of budget balance rules is their specic design and their interaction with the
overall rule environment of the country. Most importantly, we nd that maintaining a smaller number
of scal rules is essential. We also see that the existence of a credible monitoring mechanism at the
supra-national level strengthens the treatment eects of scal rules while the existence of an escape
clause undermines it completely. This work makes helpful contributions to the policy debate about the
eectiveness of scal rules and their scal consequences in more general. Despite their overall positive
eect on decits, the country-specic responses to budget balance rules can be surprising at times when
not properly designed.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the question of how additional revenues impact spending decisions
of governments, both in terms of overall spending levels and, more specically, for what exactly the
additional funds are used or where spending is cut. Being closely intertwined with each other, credibly
identifying the causal eect of one on the other is empirically challenging and has led, not surprisingly,
to contradicting results so far. Together with Clemens Fuest and Florian Neumeier, we use the institu-
tional setting of German scal federalism to its advantage in order to explore how scal policy reacts
to exogenous tax revenue shocks: while states in Germany enjoy full spending autonomy, virtually
all taxes are set and collected at the federal level, thus providing an interesting testing ground to as-
sess whether exogenous changes in tax revenues aect aggregate public expenditure as well as specic
sub-categories of local government spending.
In order to construct a series of ‘truly’ exogenous tax revenue shocks at the state-level, we apply
the so-called narrative approach, pioneered by Romer and Romer (2009), and exclude changes in tax
legislation which are related to the current or expected future economic or scal situation. Examples
of obviously endogenous tax changes include those that are implemented as part of a broader stimulus
package during an economic downturn or changes whose revenues are earmarked to future spending
requirements. With this series of exogenous tax shocks at hand, we document that cuts to available tax
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revenues lead to subsequent reductions in states’ public spending of roughly the same amount, following
a delay of two to three years. When looking at more specic spending items of local governments, it is
found that a revenue decline of one Euro reduces public spending on administration and, with a larger
delay, social security, by 30 to 45 cents in each case. Spending on infrastructure declines by ten cents.
Interestingly, we nd no signicant eects on spending on education, legal protection and public safety,
or culture.
The results of this analysis feed into the discussion concerning the welfare consequences of ever
growing public spending and its eectiveness. More broadly, our results conrm the claim that lower
tax revenues restrain government spending at the sub-national level – a hypothesis that has found
prominent support among scholars but lacked convincing empirical grounding until now. Nevertheless,
the question whether revenue cuts and resulting spending cuts are actually eciency-enhancing, as it
is believed by the supporters of this idea, remains to be discussed. While it is certainly comforting that a
large share of the spending cut is made by reducing (supposedly unproductive) administrative spending
with no (statistically signicant) changes to expenditures on education and science, it needs to be borne
in mind that, according to our estimation results, government spending on infrastructure projects as
well as health and social security related issues declines as well, something which is likely to not let
overall productivity unaected in the mid- and longer run if not oset by private investment activity.
Chapter 3 of this thesis turns to the implications of local tax and expenditure policies and raises an
old question: do voters value the quality of local public goods in their neighborhood, such as whether
pavements are clean, whether benches in the park need repair, or whether local roads are in good shape?
The question is not easy to answer, particularly so because scarce data on the quality of public services at
the local level, e.g. from surveys, has been a limiting factor in the existing literature. Not surprisingly,
most studies are restricted to city-specic case studies or cross-sectional variation therein, obviously
raising questions concerning the internal and external validity of the available results (Burnett and
Kogan, 2017, and Arnold and Carnes, 2012, are recent examples).
This study breaks new ground by using posts from the online complaint website FixMyStreet.com,
a platform that enjoys increasing popularity in the United Kingdom with more than two million en-
tries to date since its existence in early 2007. With an application on their cell-phone installed, users
can easily send complaints to the platform in order to alert their local authorities about broken street
lamps, potholes, y-tipping, and other issues. Using around 550,000 geo-located complaints that were
posted on the website between May 2007 and May 2015, I compute quality indicators for all 7,500 local
wards that comprise the whole of England based on how quickly complaints are solved. For example,
a relatively large share of complaints that is left unsolved for a year or even longer speaks to a rather
poorly functioning complaint management of the local district. As would be expected, the share of
complaints not solved after twelve months shows a large negative correlation with targeted district-
level spending of councils on the provision of certain services, suggesting that the level of funding of
public administration is relevant for the quality of service provision.
I leverage within-neighborhood variation with respect to the quality of local public good provision
over time to test whether increases in the share of complaints unsolved for at least a year have an
impact on the re-election probability of the local councilor’s party or the councilor itself. Councilors
are ordinary citizens of the neighborhood, elected as representatives of the ward and the people living in
it and play an important role in planning, running, monitoring, and developing local council activities.
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Competencies of local district councils are far-reaching and include, for example, rubbish collection,
recycling practices, housing development as well as other planning applications such as repair work or
local infrastructure maintenance and development. These are services for which most requests are sent
to the online complaint platform. The results provide compelling evidence for a strong punishment
eect in local council elections: an increase in the fraction of complaints that are solved only after
twelve months or never raises the probability that the incumbent party is voted out of oce by up to
nine percentage points. The eect is also visible when moving to the individual politician-level. The
overall eect is driven by reports concerning incidents of y-tipping and dog fouling on public grounds.
Contrary to previous results in this literature, I nd that the number of complaints per se is not relevant
for incumbents’ re-election chances.
To some extent, the results of this chapter are resembling the ndings of the academic literature on
best management practices and eective complaint management of rms: it is often argued that a com-
plaint is rather seen as a chance for rms to restore and strengthen trust and loyalty among customers
if the rm’s service in response to the complaint “exceeds expectations”, e.g. quickly delivering on the
promise, potentially providing a personal touch to the interaction and, most importantly, showing the
willingness to go the extra mile in order to x things (Stone, 2011). On the other hand, a poor service
quality that does not deliver what was promised or that reveals that no eort is being made to work
on the situation, makes it very likely that the customer is switching to other companies – just as in the
case of complaints about local public goods and how it is dealt with it.
Finally, Chapter 4, based on joint work with Clemens Fuest and Florian Neumeier, studies the sen-
sitivity of corporate prots to changes in the local corporate income tax under a system of ‘Formula
Apportionment’, an idea that has taken center stage in ongoing debates about a reform of the corporate
tax system. The current tax scheme at the national level in the EU is based on the principle of ‘Separate
Accounting’: each aliate is taxed based on the prots generated within the borders of each jurisdiction.
Given the changing nature of business practices, this is not considered suitable anymore. Increasing us-
age on intangible assets in the production process and an accelerating trend towards digital business
models have made it easy for multi-national companies to shift their prots to those jurisdictions that
oer the most favorable tax conditions in order to minimize their overall tax obligations. Beyond this
background, the European Commission has proposed to replace the current system by a ‘Consolidated
Common Corporate Tax Base’ (CCCTB), according to which prots of all company’s aliates are ag-
gregated to generate a ‘consolidated tax base’ before being apportioned to the individual jurisdictions
again according to an apportionment factor, such as the payroll cost share. It is widely believed, and
hoped, that the system of ‘Formula Apportionment’ makes it more dicult for rms to shift their prots
across jurisdictions by manipulating apportionment keys.
The local corporate prot taxation in Germany provides an ideal testing ground for this hypothesis.
Prots of rms that are present in more than one local municipality are consolidated at the national level
and then apportioned across all jurisdictions according to their relative payroll share in each municipal-
ity. Municipalities in Germany – more than twelve thousand in total – can independently decide about
their local corporate tax rate via a tax rate scaling factor which varies substantially across municipalities
and over time. In order to address the question how rms’ prot shifting activities respond to tax rate
dierentials across jurisdictions, we employ administrative tax return data on all multi-jurisdictional
enterprises. An advantage of such data in this context, which is worth to be pointed out, is the fact that
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it is not limited by usual empirical diculties, such as incomplete and erroneous information on rms’
activities in ‘tax havens’, as highlighted for example in Tørsløv et al. (2018).
Contrary to popular belief, a range of robust panel-regression results suggests that a system of
‘Formula Apportionment’ does not mean the end to prot shifting activities of multi-jurisdictional rms.
On average, an increase in the local tax rate by ten percentage points leads to a reduction of the local tax
base of rms by around twelve per cent. Importantly, we nd that adjustments of rms across industries
varies greatly: sectors in which workers are predominantly paid by the hours worked, where overtime
work is paid, or in which so-called Mini-Jobs are more prevalent nd it easier to adjust local payroll
costs and respond strongly to local tax rate dierentials.
These results have important implications for our understanding of corporate business taxation
under ‘Formula Apportionment’. The political debate and numerous existing studies (see for example
Devereux and Loretz, 2008) have been guided by the assumption that rms cannot adjust to local tax
rate changes as easily as under the current system of ‘Separate Accounting’. Our results demonstrate
that this is not true, both in terms of the average response across all rms and with respect to some
sectors in particular. Most importantly, while the response under the system of ‘Separate Accounting’
is mostly restricted to shifting paper prots, under ‘Formula Apportionment’ MJEs are locally adjusting





Individual Treatment Eects of Budget Balance Rules
This chapter is based on joint work with Francesca Caselli
and Philippe Wingender, IMF Working Paper Nr. 2020/274.
1.1 Introduction
Fiscal rules have increasingly been used to strengthen scal discipline and constrain budget decits:
between 1985 and 2015, a total of 89 countries from all over the world introduced a budget balance rule.1
Despite their rapid diusion, the empirical evidence on the eectiveness of scal rules remains mixed
because of challenges to establish a causal link with scal outcomes.2 Empirical results suggest that
countries that introduce a rule tend to have lower budget decits (Poterba, 1997, Debrun et al., 2008,
Badinger and Reuter, 2017), however, studies that correctly account for rules’ endogeneity tend to pro-
duce insignicant results (Heinemann et al., 2018, Caselli and Reynaud, 2020). While most studies focus
on the average eect of scal rules’ adoption, some recent papers have investigated the heterogeneous
impacts of scal rules on budget balances. Caselli and Wingender (2018), by constructing counter-factual
distributions of government balances, uncover a ‘magnet eect’ of the three per cent scal ceiling in the
European Union: the adoption of the rule reduces the occurrence of both large government decits and
surpluses. This implies not only that the rule had an eect on decits when it was not complied with
the rule, but also on prudent countries.3
However, as stressed in the program evaluation literature, the eect of a policy on the distribution
of outcomes is not the same as the distribution of the eects (Heckman et al., 1997, Abbring and Heck-
man, 2007, Bedoya et al., 2017). While subtle, the dierence between the impact on the distribution and
the distribution of the impacts is important. Estimating the distribution of treatment eects is impor-
tant to uncover further layers of heterogeneity by computing, for instance, the variance of treatment
eects or what proportion of countries were ‘helped’ or ‘hurt’ by the rule. Also, it can shed light on
whether countries changed their rank in the outcome distribution because of the introduction of the
rule. However, estimating individual treatment eects is challenging because it requires estimating a
1Source: IMF Fiscal Rules Database.
2For example, countries with scal rules could have a stronger preference for scal prudence and discipline, even in the
absence of the rule. Moreover, the adoption of such a rule could reect the overall scal situation or can be part of a general
scal overhaul. In both cases, countries with already smaller levels of public decits would also be more likely to adopt a scal
rule, thus rendering the causal interpretation of the impact of the scal rule on decits invalid.
3Under a rank-invariance assumption, the authors also derive country-specic eects and nd that all countries have seen
their scal position improve on average because of the decit rule.
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counter-factual for every treated unit. In this paper we overcome this challenge by adopting a Syn-
thetic Control Method (SCM) to estimate individual treatment eects of budget balance rules in a large
sample of advanced and emerging economies, and low-income countries. We also address the lack of in-
ference in most SCM studies exploiting the insight by Arkhangelsky et al. (2019), who propose inference
methods for a version of the SCM with unit weights.
The use of SCM allows us to obtain country-specic counter-factuals and hence to go one step
further and analyze the key determinants of rules’ eectiveness. While previous studies have mostly
relied on anecdotal evidence (for examples see Primo, 2007, and International Monetary Fund, 2018), we
exploit the cross-country variation in the timing and design of budget balance rules and in the magnitude
(and sign) of the treatment eects to quantify the impact of particular features of the rule in a systematic
way.
Our ndings point to a sizable heterogeneity in the size of the treatment eect. Most importantly,
it is found that the eects of the scal rule at the top and the bottom of the balance distribution are of
opposite signs: while the rule has reduced the decit of high-decit countries, it has increased it among
low-decit countries. Overall, the introduction of the rule has pulled the individual observations to the
center of the distribution. From a methodological point of view, this shows that while usual approaches
which are concerned with the average treatment eect correctly estimate the eect on the ‘average
country’, it does not capture the full extent of the impact of the scal rule on all countries’ decits.
Concretely, the average eect overstates the eect on high-balance countries and, more importantly, it
understates the true eect for high-decit countries.
Finally, when we link the individual treatment eects with rules’ characteristics, our results suggest
that the design of the scal rule is indeed critical for its eectiveness (see International Monetary Fund,
2018, and Caselli and Reynaud, 2020). Specically, we nd that maintaining a small overall number
of scal rules is key. We also see that a monitoring process outside the government, especially at the
supra-national level, improves the eect of the budget balance rule signicantly while the existence of
an escape clause has a diminishing eect.
The roadmap of this chapter is as follows: Sections 1.2 and 1.3 provide an introduction to the SCM,
the specication of our baseline model, and the data used. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 present the baseline
individual treatment eect results and a series of exercises to assess the goodness of the t and its
robustness to alternative specications. In Section 1.6 we analyze the role of specic features of rules’
design and their eectiveness. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Synthetic Control Method and Model Specication
This section introduces the notation used throughout the paper and briey reviews the SCM esti-
mation. The SCM is a data-driven procedure to build counter-factual outcomes for observations that
are subject to a treatment, e.g. the introduction of a scal rule. It is particularly well suited when units
of observation are at an aggregate level such as countries for which it can be dicult to nd a suitable
counter-factual that resembles the treated country.4
4As argued in Abadie et al. (2010), with aggregate data and in an observational context it is more promising to use a
weighted combination of several untreated units instead of a single untreated unit as a counter-factual. Doudchenko and
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In a set of countries i = 1, . . . ,N over T periods, country 1 is the only country that receives the
treatment in period s < T . For a given value of the scal rule indicator FRi ∈ {0, 1} for whether the
country is ever treated and values of the government budget balance Yi,t , we dene potential outcomes
Yi,t (FRi ) as follows:
Yi,t (FRi ) =
{
Yi,t (0), if FRi = 0
Yi,t (1), if FRi = 1
∀ t ≥ s
The size of the treatment eect on the outcome of interest would be straightforward to infer by
comparing actual outcomes and their counter-factuals, i.e. τ1,t = Y1,t (1) − Y1,t (0) ∀ t ≥ s , where
Y1,t (0) denotes the counter-factual for country 1 had it not adopted the scal rule. However, we cannot
observe a country in both states simultaneously: whileYi,t (1) is observable for those countries that have
adopted a scal rule, Y1,t (0) is not directly observable in the data.
The SCM allows to build a counter-factual for each treated observation, i.e. the outcome of interest
in the absence of the treatment. Concretely, it nds the weighted average of all potential comparison
units which is ‘closest’ to the treated unit in terms of pre-treatment outcomes.
To do this, we use the following two-step nested minimization problem. We wish to match in the
pre-treatment period both:
1. The weighted average of K predictors in the control group X0 to the weighted average of those
predictors for the treated unit X1; and
2. The time path of the (weighted) average outcome among control units Y0 to the outcome for the
treated unit Y1.
To match the treated country to the weighted average of the control units along the two dimensions,
we need two sets of weights. A rst set of country-level weights W = (ω2, ...,ωN ) is used to build
weighted averages of the K predictors and the outcome variable among control units. A second set of
predictor-level weights denoted by the diagonal matrix V is used to linearly combine the K predictors.
Under the usual identifying assumptions, any dierence between the treated unit and this synthetic
control is due to the treatment itself, since both units have the same (weighted) average values for
predictors and outcome in the pre-treatment period.
Formally, objective 1) is expressed as
Ŵ (V ) = arg min
W
(X1 − X0W )
′V (X1 − X0W ) (1.1)
with country-level weightsW = (ω2, ...,ωN ), ωi ≥ 0 and
∑N
i=2ωi = 1 and taken as given the predictor-
level weight matrix V , a diagonal positive semi-denite matrix of dimension K × K with trace equal to
one.
For objective 2), we wish to nd a linear combination of the K predictors that yields, through Equa-
tion 1.1, the set of country-level weights Ŵ (V ) that in turn produces the smallest distance between the
synthetic control and the treated unit. This can be expressed as
V̂ = arg min
V
(
Y1 − Y0Ŵ (V )
) ′ (
Y1 − Y0Ŵ (V )
)
, (1.2)
Imbens (2016) note that the SCM can be viewed as a generalization of the standard dierence-in-dierences approach, with
the weights on the control units chosen to better match the pre-treatment trend of the unit that is exposed to the treatment.
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noting that Ŵ (V ), the solution to Equation 1.1, implicitly depends on the choice of matrix V .
The data-driven approach just described is highly exible and allows for a very broad denition
of X0. To see why, consider for example that the set of predictors X0 could be dened as the pre-
treatment country-level average of k predictors. Alternatively, X0 could also be dened as the set of
annual observations of the same k predictors, so that the total number of predictors used in Equation
1.1 would instead be K = s × k . Given some choice of X0, Equation 1.2 would then select the matrix V
that combines all predictors K to best match pre-treatment outcomes across the two groups. Note the
matrix V does not have an economic interpretation but serves only to achieve the best pre-treatment
match possible between treated unit and synthetic control unit.
Without economic theory to guide the choice of the weighting matrix V , there is a risk researchers
will use specication searching to cherry-pick the set ofK predictors that yields the desired outcome for
the subsequent treatment eect estimation. This ‘p-hacking’ would aect the size of tests for statistical
signicance of treatment eects as shown by Ferman et al. (2020). Consequently, the authors recommend
using all the pre-treatment outcome lags as predictors. This also simplies the algorithm above to
Ŵ (V ) = arg min
W
(Y1 − Y0W )
′ (Y1 − Y0W ) ,
where we minimize the distance between outcomes for treated and synthetic control by searching di-
rectly for the country-level weightsW .
After estimating country-level weights Ŵ that produce the synthetic control with the closest pre-
treatment match, we can construct post-treatment counter-factual outcomes for the treated unit using




ω̂iYi,t , ∀ t ≥ s .
We estimate the treatment eect at each point in time using
τ̂1,t = Y1,t −
N∑
i=2
ω̂iYi,t , ∀ t ≥ s .
If the number of pre-intervention periods in the data is suciently large, matching on pre-intervention
outcomes can allow us to control for the heterogeneous responses to multiple unobserved factors. The
intuition here is that only units that are alike along both observables and unobservables would follow
a similar pre-treatment trajectory.
As a baseline, we choose the predictor-level weight matrixV such that pre-treatment outcomes are
matched on the lags of the government balance with no additional covariates (see Doudchenko and
Imbens, 2016, and Ferman et al., 2020).5 In a set of robustness checks, we use instead other covariates
in the two-step SCM algorithm outlined above. We allow the pre-treatment period for calibrating the
donor weights to be as long as data availability allows but not longer than ten years.6 We also allow for
5See also Kaul et al. (2015) for a discussion of covariates in SCM.
6In fact, given that the available data on scal balances start in 1980 and the rst scal rules were introduced in the early
1990s, this is the longest pre-treatment horizon that the data would allow to use.
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ten years after the introduction of the scal rule in our baseline scenario.7 Thus, the sample window
for every treated country can be at most 21 years in total. The pool of donor countries is restricted to
those that have complete budget balance data over the same time horizon as the treated country and
did not introduce a scal rule themselves within this time horizon. Moreover, as our baseline speci-
cation, we only consider donor countries that are in the same or in an adjacent income class group, as
classied by the World Bank. For example, high-income countries are matched to other high-income
countries or those from the upper middle-income group. Similarly, low-income countries are only paired
with other low-income countries and those in the lower middle-income country group. To account for
country-specic and time-invariant factors, we de-mean the government balance data by subtracting
the pre-treatment average by country. If selection into treatment is only correlated with time-invariant
common factors, e.g. a general taste for scal prudence, then the de-trended synthetic control estimator
is unbiased. Finally, the use of SCM is particularly appealing because of its transparency in construct-
ing counter-factual observations. Compared to standard regression methods, the chosen weights make
explicit what each control unit contributes to the counter-factual.
To conduct inference, we make use of the recent result of Arkhangelsky et al. (2019) who provide
a new perspective on the SCM treatment eect as a weighted least squares regression estimator with
time xed-eects of the following form:
(









Yi,t − µ − βt − FRiτ1,t
)2
ω̂i , (1.3)
where βt are year xed-eects and FRi is an indicator variable that is equal to one in the case of the
treated country. Importantly, the authors show that under standard assumptions, the estimation un-
certainty of the SCM weights ω̂i can be ignored under plausible assumptions. This simplies inference
considerably as the weights obtained in the rst step can be used in estimating Equation 1.3 without
further adjustment.
1.3 Data
We investigate the country-specic impact of budget balance rules (BBRs) on the nominal govern-
ment balance in a sample of 193 countries between 1980 and 2018. The sample combines data from the
IMF World Economic Outlook database with historic scal balance series from Mauro et al. (2015) and
the IMF Government Finance Statistics.8 Among the 151 countries in our sample, 53 countries have
adopted a budget balance rule with varying numerical targets.9 Table A.1 lists the rule adopters, year
of adoption, the numerical target of the rule, and its coverage (general or central government). Most
7This leaves enough time to let the eects of the scal rule materialize and become visible while being also short enough to
minimize the risk that other major country-specic changes could potentially alter the true underlying country weights. It is
not uncommon in the literature to use substantially longer post-treatment horizons. For example, Campos et al. (2019) analyze
the country-specic growth eects of European integration and use the obtained weights for extrapolating counter-factual
GDP series for as much as 30 years in some cases.
8We restrict the set of countries to those that have at least one million inhabitants in 2018.
9We exclude six countries (Cameroon, Chad, Estonia, Indonesia, Mali, and Singapore) due to limitations in data availability
in the early 1990s. We also exclude India from our analysis as it had a budget balance rule in place only for one year.
19
1.4 Individual Treatment Eects
countries have adopted scal rules restricting the decit to levels not larger than three per cent or zero
per cent of GDP.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the scal balance for countries that have adopted a
scal rule (‘Rulers’) and those without scal rule (‘Non-Rulers’) between 1980 and 2018. Not surpris-
ingly, decits are larger on average for country-year observations without scal rules compared to the
situation with scal rule in place. The table also shows that rulers and non-rulers are dierent with
respect to other macroeconomic and institutional characteristics. This is particularly true for income
per capita, ination, and interest rates as well as the old-age dependency ratio. A simple comparison
of the average decits of rulers and non-rulers is therefore likely to give a biased estimate of the causal
eect of scal rules on decits.
Rulers Non-Rulers
Obs. Mean Min. Max. Obs. Mean Min. Max.
Government Balance, % of GDP 808 −2.17 −15.14 18.55 3817 −2.60 −19.80 19.39
Population Size, mio. inhabitants 815 24.72 0.67 200.96 4516 34.67 0.24 1395.38
GDP per capita, in 1,000 USD 815 24.67 0.57 70.03 4451 13.41 0.28 172.99
Government Debt, in % of GDP 811 61.01 0.05 233.72 4167 60.79 0.00 2092.92
Old Age Dependency Ratio, in % 809 18.73 4.07 35.59 4943 9.80 0.80 46.17
Ination Rate, in % 815 2.62 −3.98 25.87 4422 260.78 −72.73 929 790.00
Trade openness, in % of GDP 812 91.79 20.72 442.62 4149 72.77 0.02 376.22
Short-Term Interest Rate, in % 691 3.68 −0.69 19.92 2641 34.20 −0.78 41 280.00
Federal State, 0/1-Dummy 815 0.19 0.00 1.00 5035 0.15 0.00 1.00
Participation in IMF Program 815 0.26 0.00 1.00 5035 0.34 0.00 1.00
Commodity Terms of Trade Ind. 802 100.06 48.56 111.81 4455 98.03 31.92 130.96
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (April 2019), IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS), World Bank
World Development Indicators Database, Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA Database), and Gruss and Kebhaj
(2019).
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics on Main Economic Variables for Countries with and without Fiscal Rule
1.4 Individual Treatment Eects
In this section we present the main set of results. Figure 1.1 reports the key nding of our analysis:
it plots the individual eect of introducing a budget balance rule on countries’ government balance.
Countries that would have had large decits in the absence of the rule exhibit positive and statistically
signicant treatment eects, thus reducing their budget decits. On the other hand, countries with
budget surpluses also respond to scal rules by reducing their eorts to maintain a budget surplus and
move closer to the numerical target of the rule. This is in line with previous ndings that the scal rule
has exerted a ‘magnet eect’ on budget balances by pulling decits and surpluses closer to the center of
the distribution. Overall, the average treatment eect is signicant, positive, and equal to around two
to three per cent of GDP after ten years, as indicated by the horizontal line in the gure. From a policy
perspective, it is also important to note that the average eect is not able to capture the heterogeneity
in terms of the individual treatment eects. While it largely underestimates the eect for countries with
large decits, it vastly overstates (and predicts the wrong sign of) the treatment eect for countries with
small decits and surpluses as indicated by the dierence between the average and linear t.
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Note: The gure depicts the treatment eect for all countries with scal rules for the ten-year post-treatment period as obtained
from the baseline SC specication as a function of their counter-factual budget balance, i.e. what the budget would have been if
the rule would not have been introduced. The counter-factual balance on the horizontal axis is centered around the numerical
value of the scal rule in each country.
Figure 1.1: Individual Treatment Eects of Fiscal Rules by Level of Counter-factual Government Balance
We compute the average treatment eect across countries together with the corresponding 95 per
cent condence interval obtained from the estimation of Equation 1.3. Figure A.2 shows that the size
of the treatment eect in the post-treatment period increases gradually in the rst six years after the
introduction of the rule before reaching a long-run eect of around two to three per cent of GDP.
This suggests that the introduction of the scal rule led to an economically and statistically signicant
reduction in the scal decit for the average country. Figure A.3 plots the time paths of the 10th and the
90th percentiles of the actual and the counter-factual distribution before and after the introduction of
the scal rule. The actual budget decit of countries at the lower end of the budget balance distribution
is considerably smaller in magnitude than in the case without scal rules in place. As mentioned before
already, these countries have reduced their decits substantially.
1.5 Quality of the SCM Estimates and Robustness Exercises
In this section we assess the quality of our baseline model and test alternative specications. First,
we want to assess the quality of the pre-treatment t as it is the key aspect for the validity of the SC
estimates. However, there is a lack of consensus on what constitutes a suciently good pre-treatment t
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Note: In order to assess the quality of the achieved pre-treatment t for each treated country for which a counter-factual is
constructed from the SC, Adhikari et al. (2018) propose to use the ratio of the Root Mean Squared Prediction Error (RMSPE)
and the RMSPE obtained from the zero-t model. The ratio of the two is denoted as ‘Goodness of Fit Index’. A value of zero
for the index indicates a perfect t, while larger values of the ratio correspond to worse ts. According to the authors, a t
that yields an index larger than one should be discarded because the t is performing not better than just predicting zeros.
The above boxplot is based on all 46 indices, one from each country with scal rule in the baseline specication for which we
constructed a synthetic counter-factual.
Figure 1.2: Assessment of the Quality of the Pre-Treatment Fit in the Baseline SC Specication
of the synthetic counter-factual when compared to the actual outcome. We follow Adhikari et al. (2018)
who propose to use the ratio of the Root Mean Squared Prediction Error (RMSPE) and a benchmark
























The index takes values greater or equal than zero, where smaller values indicate a better t. Adhikari
et al. (2018) suggest that if the index exceeds the value of one, the counter-factual fails to describe the
actual path of the outcome variable of the treated country reasonably well and should be discarded.
Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of the indices which are well below one, suggesting a suciently high
quality of the t.
Second, as already noted, another key feature of the SCM is to make the weights assigned to the
treated unit explicit. Figure A.1 displays the weights of donor countries for every treated country in our
sample. Treated countries are ranked according to their GDP per capita in 2018 in descending order on
the horizontal axis, and the corresponding donor countries for each country on the vertical axis, also
ranked according to GDP per capita. Each row contains the corresponding weights for every treated
country, with larger weights displayed in darker red. The gure conrms that treated units tend to
be matched with countries at a similar level of income. In our sample, positive weights are assigned
to more than 40 countries from the pool of donor countries on average, but it can be as high as 60 in
some cases. This comes with the advantage that potential country-specic shocks in the group of donor
22
Chapter 1. Individual Treatment Eects of Budget Balance Rules
0 .2 .4 .6
Goodness of Fit Index
Note: In this robustness test, the set of donor countries is not restricted to countries of the same or adjacent income groups.
This could improve the quality of the t if it was a binding constraint in the baseline SC. See notes below Figure 1.2 for an
explanation of the ‘Goodness of Fit Index’ by Adhikari et al. (2018).
Figure 1.3: Assessment of the Quality of the Pre-Treatment Fit in the Robustness SC Specication without
Income Group Conditioning
countries or cross-country spillover eects to geographically neighboring countries are negligible if
single country-specic weights are small.
Third, we implement a series of robustness checks to assess the stability of our baseline results to a
dierent set of donor countries and the use of covariates instead of lagged outcomes in the SCM algo-
rithm. We also assess whether the results are inuenced by restricting the pool of potential donors to
countries only in the same or adjacent income level. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of the Adhikari
et al. (2018) index without donor pool restriction. This means that all countries, for which complete
balance data is available, can be potentially used for the construction of the synthetic counter-factual
independently of their level of economic development. Figure 1.3 shows that the shape of the distri-
bution including those countries for which the pre-treatment t is worst within the sample is only
marginally changed as compared to the baseline scenario when conditioning on income levels (Figure
1.2). This suggests that conditioning on income classes is for most cases a non-binding constraint in
terms of the quality of the pre-treatment t.
Fourth, we assess the robustness of our main results by using relevant predictors of the scal balance
in the nested optimization algorithm of Abadie et al. (2010). Specically, we condition on the debt-
to-GDP ratio, GDP per capita, ination rates (all from the IMF World Economic Outlook database), a
commodity terms of trade index (from Gruss and Kebhaj, 2019) and whether there has been an IMF
program in place. Weights are estimated based on the pre-treatment averages of all regressors. Figures
A.4 and A.5 conrm the magnet eect at the individual country-level and the positive average treatment
eect of the rule. However, it is challenging to construct similar synthetic controls in terms of the pre-
treatment trend with incomplete data on the economic characteristics used as regressors for some of
the treated and untreated countries.
Finally, we test the robustness of the baseline specication to alternative pre- and post-treatment
windows. We restrict the length of the pre- and post-treatment horizon to ve years only. The result on
the distribution of individual treatment eects is illustrated in Figure A.6 showing a very similar pattern
to Figure 1.1.
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1.6 Eectiveness of Fiscal Rules
The eective design of scal rules has been a longstanding question in the literature. A range of
studies exploiting either cross-country or cross-state variation with respect to the ‘strength’ of scal
rules document that stronger rules are generally better in restraining decits (see e.g. Poterba, 1994,
for the US and Badinger and Reuter, 2017, for the EU; Caselli and Reynaud, 2020). In many cases, these
studies rely on a composite index of strength that aggregates several features, such as the coverage of
the rule, the degree of independence of monitoring and enforcement bodies, existence of correction
mechanisms and sanctions, etc. Based on a small set of case studies for countries that have adopted
scal rules in recent years, International Monetary Fund (2018) compares the actual outcome of public
debt and expenditures with their counter-factual paths in absence of the scal rule over a ten-year time
horizon as derived from a SCM estimation. It then relates improvements with respect to those indicators
(or the lack thereof) to some specic features of the rule, based on anecdotal evidence.
The granular information on country-specic treatment eects together with information on the
specic design of scal rules in these countries allows us to test in a systematic way what makes scal
rules more or less eective at constraining short-term scal policy. Special attention is devoted to some
of the hypotheses that have been put forward in International Monetary Fund (2018): rst, an increasing
number and complexity of scal rules in place increases the potential of conict between the rules and
the probability of non-compliance. Second, the existence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
can incentivize compliance with the rules, e.g. through raising public awareness.
The information on scal rule design is summarized in Table 1.2.10 On average, countries in our
sample have three rules in place, including rules at the national and the supra-national level. The most
frequent combination is to have budget balance rules, many of them at the supra-national level, together
with restrictions on public debt. We note that if a country has adopted a supra-national budget balance
rule, it always includes a monitoring and an enforcement mechanism. For BBRs at the national level,
this is only true in half of the cases. Dierences exist with respect to the existence of escape clauses. It
appears that this feature is included only in a minority of rules adopted.
Table 1.3 shows the estimation results for the number and types of rules in place. Specically, we
estimate the following regression equation:
τ̂i,t = α +
7∑
k=2




l ∈{exp, rev, debt}
γl × 1l,i,t︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
other rules in place
+
∑
m∈{sup, nat + sup}
δm × 1m,i,t︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
level of decit rule
+ϵi,t .
The indicator variables 1i,t in all three parts of the regression capture dierent aspects of the design
of scal rules. The rst set of dummy variables refers to the total number of rules in place. In this case,
the indicator variable is equal to one if country i has a total amount of k rules (of any sort) in place
at time t . In general, there can be a total amount of eight dierent rules (rules on the decit, debt,
revenue, and expenditure – both at the national and the supra-national level). The largest number of
10We consider all the post-treatment years for the 46 countries with scal rules in place. For some countries, e.g. those
that adopted the scal rule only after 2010 or that have removed the scal rule after a few years again, we have less than ten
years of post-treatment observations.
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Rule Feature Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Number of national rules 420 0.89 1.03
Number of supra-national rules 420 2.09 1.14
Number of rules, national and supra-national 420 2.97 1.30
Dummy, expenditure rule 420 0.32 0.47
Dummy, revenue rule in place 420 0.21 0.41
Dummy, debt rule in place 420 0.87 0.33
Dummy, BBR at the national level only 420 0.18 0.38
Dummy, BBR at the supra-national level only 420 0.64 0.48
Dummy, BBR at both national and supra-national level 420 0.18 0.39
If BBR at supra-national level exists: Dummy, monitoring outside gov’t 346 1.00 0.00
If BBR at national level exists: Dummy, monitoring outside gov’t 166 0.42 0.50
Either BBR at national or supra-national: Dummy, monitoring outside gov’t 420 0.90 0.30
If BBR at supra-national level exists: Dummy, enforcement mech. 345 1.00 0.00
If BBR at national level exists: Dummy, enforcement mech. 149 0.40 0.49
Either BBR at national or supra-national: Dummy, enforcement mech. 420 0.92 0.27
If BBR at supra-national level exists: Dummy, escape clause 345 0.45 0.50
If BBR at national level exists: Dummy, escape clause 148 0.30 0.46
Either BBR at national or supra-national: Dummy, escape clause 420 0.47 0.50
Source: IMF Fiscal Rules Database.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics on Fiscal Rule Designs
rules that we observe in our sample is a total of seven. We are interested in the coecient βk related to
each of the six potential outcomes (having only one rule in place is taken as the benchmark outcome).
Column 1 shows that a smaller set of rules positively correlates with a positive eect of the rule on
budget balances and the eect is statistically signicant. For example, scal decits in countries with
two rules have improved by almost four per cent of GDP upon introduction of the rule. Column 2 adds
to the discussion of how the existence of other, potentially conicting rules, can have an impact on the
eect of budget balance rules. We include an indicator variable in the regression that is equal to one
if country i has, for instance, a debt rule in addition to a scal decit rule in period t . The results do
not suggest that the existence of other rules has an impact on the size of the treatment eect of budget
balance rules, except for the case of debt rules which appears to have a positive eect. Similarly, also the
fact that some countries have supra-national BBRs in addition to rules at the national level does seem
to have a positive impact on the treatment eect size (column 3).
Next, we test the impact of rule design and institutional features, namely the existence of a monitor-
ing mechanism, an enforcement procedure, and the possibility to trigger an escape clause. In the same
fashion as before, we estimate the following regression equation:
τ̂i,t = α +
∑
k ∈{nat, sup, nat + sup}




l ∈{nat, sup, nat + sup}
γl × 1l,i,t︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
enforcement mechanism




1.6 Eectiveness of Fiscal Rules
Dep. variable: Size of the Treatment Eect
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy: 2 num. rules 4.17
***
(0.81)
Dummy: 3 num. rules 1.54
**
(0.65)
Dummy: 4 num. rules 2.65
**
(0.75)
Dummy: 5 num. rules 2.56
**
(1.19)
Dummy: 6 num. rules 1.21(1.12)
Dummy: 7 num. rules 1.13(1.83)
Dummy: Exp. Rule −0.16(0.62)
Dummy: Rev. Rule −0.95(0.97)
Dummy: Debt Rule 2.33
***
(0.81)
Dummy: BBR at the 2.32***
supra-nat. level (0.80)
Dummy: BBR at the 0.93




Observations 420 420 420
R2 0.10 0.03 0.04
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country-
level and are displayed in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.3: The Impact of Rule Complexity on the Eect of Fiscal Rules
Table 1.4, column 1 shows that the improvements of the scal balance are particularly strong for
countries that have monitoring mechanisms at the supra-national level, as compared to countries that
have either national monitoring mechanisms or none. The size of the treatment eect is large in mag-
nitude and statistically highly signicant. It would suggest that those countries with monitoring at the
supra-national level would reduce their decit by more than two per cent of GDP vis-à-vis countries
with no monitoring at all. Similarly, countries with enforcement mechanisms at the supra-national level
also improve their balances after introducing scal rules (column 2). The eect is smaller in magnitude,
though. Lastly, the existence of an escape clause as part of the scal rule has a detrimental eect on the
size of the treatment eect. The results indicate that allowing for the possibility to trigger an escape
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clause reduces the eect of the scal rule from around two per cent of GDP without escape clause by
two percentage points to a zero-eect.
Dep. variable: Size of the Treatment Eect
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy: Monitoring 1.03
outside gov’t at nat. level (0.79)
Dummy: Monitoring 2.48***
outside gov’t at supra-nat. level (0.69)
Dummy: Monitoring outside 2.46***
gov’t at nat. and supra-nat. level (0.58)
Dummy: Enforcement −0.13
procedure at national level (0.75)
Dummy: Enforcement 1.93***
procedure at supra-nat. level (0.69)
Dummy: Enforcement procedure 1.95***
at nat. and supra-nat. level (0.47)
Dummy: Existence −2.29**




Observations 420 420 420
R2 0.03 0.03 0.07
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level and
are displayed in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.4: The Impact of Specic Rule Features on the Eect of Fiscal Rules
1.7 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the heterogenous eects of budget balance rules on scal performances
in a large sample of countries. In order to derive country-specic treatment eects of the scal rule
under weak and reasonable assumptions, we apply the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) in combination
with dierence-in-dierences estimation, drawing from recent results by Arkhangelsky et al. (2019).
Our results indicate that countries with a scal rule improve their scal balance on average by two to
three per cent of GDP in the long-run after its introduction, thus documenting an overall positive and
statistically signicant average eect of the rule. However, our results also illustrate the importance of
going beyond the average treatment eect, as it masks signicant heterogeneity in the country-specic
impact of the rule. Consistent with previous ndings, we show that the improvement of the scal
balance is largest for countries with large decits in the counter-factual case where no rule is adopted.
Not unsurprisingly, also countries with budget surpluses are aected. Despite not being binding for
them, these countries see their scal balance converge to the numerical target of the scal rule after
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its introduction. Taken together, these two results conrm the hypothesis that budget balance rules
exert a ‘magnet eect’ on scal balances by pulling decits and surpluses closer to the center of the
distribution. The results are robust to various modications of the SCM specication, including changes
to the length of the pre- and post-treatment period as well as the selection of covariates based on which
the SCM weights are tted.
Our results also add to the discussion of what concrete features determine budget balance rules’
eectiveness in constraining scal decits. Based on the country-specic treatment eects from the
SCM analysis and signicant cross-country variation with respect to the specic design of scal rules,
our results indicate that its features and its interaction with the overall rule environment of the country
under consideration are both critical determinants of its success. In particular, we demonstrate that a
smaller overall number of rules and the existence of a credible and independent monitoring process for
rule compliance are the most important contributors to the success of the budget balance rule. On the
other hand, the existence of an escape clause appears to have a detrimental eect on the eectiveness of
the rule. From a policy perspective, the results highlight the fact that scal rules, despite their overall po-
tential to improve scal performances, are a complex matter and can trigger unexpected consequences,
as in the case of diminishing scal surpluses. The treatment eects are also sensible to the specic rule
design and have important interactions with the overall institutional setting.
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Chapter 2
Tax Cuts Starve the Beast: Evidence from Germany
This chapter is based on joint work with Clemens Fuest
and Florian Neumeier, CESifo Working Paper Nr. 8009.
2.1 Introduction
Over the past 25 years, many Western democracies have witnessed a rapid increase in public spend-
ing, and a corresponding increase in the tax burden. For instance, in the member states of the European
Monetary Union (EMU), public spending in relation to GDP increased on average from 41.6 per cent to
46.7 per cent between 1990 and 2015. This implies that government spending has grown notably faster
than private spending. Over the same period, public revenues have grown from 39.8 per cent to 44.6 per
cent in relation to GDP.1
Whether this development should be considered good or bad in terms of economic welfare is dis-
puted. Those who support higher government spending claim that public investment is highly produc-
tive, and that demand for publicly provided services and social insurance increase as incomes rise and
the population ages. Critics object that the expansion of public spending and taxation reects inecient
government growth. For both sides of this debate, it is important to understand the factors that enhance
or inhibit the growth of public spending.
There is a widespread view among critics that the best way of containing public spending is to
cut taxes. At an early stage, Milton Friedman has argued “[...] that the only eective way to restrain
government spending is by limiting government’s explicit tax revenue – just as a limited income is the
only eective restraint on any individual’s or family’s spending.” A similar argument was made by Alan
Greenspan around the same time at a hearing of the Senate Finance Committee and later used by Ronald
Reagan during his presidential election campaign in 1980.
The idea that lower tax revenues will restrain government spending later became known as the
starving the beast hypothesis. Its proponents have argued that tax cuts compel legislators to enact
spending cuts in order to ensure long-term scal sustainability. Critics, however, cast doubt on the
notion that legislators will bow to the threat of a government’s scal position worsening in the future.
They argue that tax cuts will inevitably lead to accelerating public debt levels or to even larger tax
increases later down the line, as opposed to spending cuts. For instance, Romer and Romer (2009)
1The gures represent the unweighted average public spending to GDP and public revenues to GDP ratios across the
EMU11. Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics.
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investigate the impact of tax cuts on US federal spending and nd no evidence supporting the starving the
beast hypothesis. They conclude that “[...] policymakers should be aware that the historical experience
suggests that tax cuts tend to lead to tax increases rather than to spending cuts” (Romer and Romer, 2009:
p. 198). However, the empirical approach adopted by Romer and Romer (2009) faces challenges. They
try to identify eects of tax cuts on spending for the US federal government only, and they concede that
“[...] because our estimates are not highly precise, the hypothesis that tax cuts exert some restraining
inuence on spending cannot be rejected” (Romer and Romer, 2009: p. 197).
In this chapter, we test the starving the beast hypothesis in a dierent institutional context, which
enables the impact of tax cuts to be identied in a more convincing way. We use panel data from the
German states (Bundesländer) spanning the years from 1992 to 2011 in order to study the scal conse-
quences of changes in tax revenues driven by changes in tax legislation. The German states provide an
ideal institutional setting for an empirical test of the starving the beast hypothesis. While the states have
full autonomy regarding debt nancing and the level and structure of public spending, they have only
very limited inuence on the level of their revenues. For most taxes, rates and bases are set collectively
by the federal government and representatives of the state governments.2 Each state then receives a
certain share of total tax revenues, the size of which is determined by a formula-based multi-step scal
equalisation scheme (see Section 2.3). Thus, changes in tax revenues at the state-level that are driven
by changes in tax legislation, can be considered exogenous insofar as they are beyond the control of an
individual state government. This is a prerequisite for the identication of the causal eect of tax cuts
on public spending. It is worth noting, though, that this also implies German state governments only
being able to choose between adjusting spending and debt nancing in response to a tax cut, whereas
they cannot raise taxes retrospectively. Methodologically, we apply the so-called narrative approach
pioneered by Romer and Romer (2009) to ensure that the changes in tax legislation that we utilise in our
empirical analysis, are unrelated to the current or expected future economic or scal situation. To this
end, we collect information from ocial government sources to identify the motivation behind each tax
bill.
Our main ndings are as follows. First, unlike Romer and Romer (2009), we identify strong support
for the starving the beast hypothesis. Our results suggest that an exogenous decrease in tax revenues
triggers a reduction in public spending of roughly the same amount. The adjustment takes place with a
considerable delay of two to three years, however. The decline in public spending following a tax cut,
occurs more quickly than the increase in spending triggered by a tax revenue hike. Neither the size
nor pace of the adjustment seem to be connected to the political and scal situation of the state. No
matter whether single-party versus coalition governments, right-wing versus left-wing governments,
states with high versus low levels of debt: they all react similarly. Regarding dierent types of public
spending, we nd that a revenue decline of one Euro reduces public spending on administration and,
with a larger delay, social security, by 30 to 45 cents in each case. Spending on infrastructure declines
by ten cents. We nd no signicant eects on spending on education, legal protection and public safety,
or culture.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section briey reviews the literature
to which our paper refers, and highlights the contribution we make. Section 2.3 provides background
2Since 2006, states are allowed to set the rate of the real estate transfer tax. In 2005, the last year before the reform, revenue
from this tax was only 2.7 per cent of overall state tax revenues.
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information on the system of scal federalism in Germany, and the degree of tax and spending auton-
omy of the German states. The construction of our exogenous tax shock series is explained in Section
2.4. Section 2.5 discusses necessary assumptions for causal inference. In Section 2.6, we introduce our
empirical model. Section 2.7 presents our results, followed by various extensions and robustness checks
in Section 2.8. Section 2.9 reects on the external validity of our ndings. Section 2.10 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature and Contribution
By studying the relationship between public spending and revenues, our paper relates to a long-
standing strand in the empirical public economics literature (see Payne, 2003, for a review of the liter-
ature). Early contributions to this literature focus on public spending and revenues at the federal level
in the US and apply VAR models as well as Granger causality tests to analyze whether tax changes are
followed by public expenditure adjustments and vice versa. With regard to the starving the beast hy-
pothesis, the results are mixed. Anderson et al. (1986) as well as von Furstenberg et al. (1986), nd that
changes in public spending trigger subsequent changes in tax revenues, but not the other way around;
thus, nding no support for the starving the beast hypothesis. Manage and Marlow (1986) as well as
Blackley (1986), in contrast, provide evidence supporting the starving the beast hypothesis. Subsequent
contributions to the literature that apply more advanced methods for the analysis of time-series data,
especially vector error correction models and cointegration techniques, as well as studies focusing on
countries other than the US, provide inconclusive results, too.3
Arguably, the lack of consensus in the empirical literature may be due to the diculty in identify-
ing changes in tax revenues unrelated to the underlying economic or scal situation. Since changes in
the economic or scal situation potentially aect both tax revenues and public expenditure at the same
time, identifying the causal eect of tax changes on public spending poses a challenge. Business cycle
uctuations, for instance, tend to give rise to adjustments in tax revenues and public spending in oppo-
site directions; hence implying that estimates of the eect of tax changes on public spending would be
biased downwards. Furthermore, tax changes may be enacted in anticipation of changes in the future
scal situation (to nance spending hikes resulting from the enactment of government programmes
or to reduce the debt burden). This indicates that decisions about taxation and expenditure are made
concurrently, although they may become eective at dierent points in time.
The paper by Romer and Romer (2009) addresses those concerns by using a so-called narrative
approach to identify tax changes unrelated to the current or expected future economic or scal situation.
The idea is to use ocial sources in order to identify the legislator’s motivation behind the introduction
of a tax bill. Based on this information, we can separate tax bills that have been enacted for reasons
unrelated to the economic or scal situation, from those that are not, thus allowing us to compile a list
of exogenous tax shocks. Romer and Romer (2009) apply the narrative approach to study how exogenous
tax changes aect the US federal government’s scal policy stance. Their ndings suggest that tax cuts
lead to future tax hikes, but not to any adjustment in the level of public spending. Accordingly, the
starving the beast hypothesis is not supported.
3Our analysis is also related to the literature on the impact of grants on subnational government spending and the ypaper
eect (see Courant et al., 1979, and Hines and Thaler, 1995). We return to this issue in the discussion of our results.
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In our empirical analysis, we adopt the narrative approach pioneered by Romer and Romer (2009) to
study the eect of exogenous tax shocks on scal policy at the state-level in Germany. It is worth noting,
however, that our study diers from Romer and Romer (2009) in at least three important aspects. The
most important dierence is the institutional framework. Unlike the US federal government, German
state governments have almost no tax autonomy and would be unable to retrospectively react to tax
cuts with the use of tax hikes, even if they wanted to. They can only respond by either decreasing
public spending or increasing public debt. In this respect, our results should not be interpreted as a
direct contradiction of Romer and Romer (2009). Rather, our results suggest that the starving the beast
eect does work in the context of the German institutional framework. If we had found that states
respond to tax revenue shocks by adjusting public debt, the starving the beast hypothesis would have
to be rejected. Here, you could object that decit nancing has its limits because highly indebted states
might damage investor trust. Yet, German states enjoy far-reaching bailout guarantees, implying that
there are practically no risk premia on state level debt. In addition, our results also apply to states
with low debt levels. The second major dierence to Romer and Romer (2009) is that we do not only
study the consequences of exogenous tax changes on aggregate public spending, but also on dierent
types of spending. These include public administration, education, and infrastructure. This is important
because one concern about pressure to cut spending is that it will harm public investment above all. A
third dierence is that we investigate whether the eects of tax changes on public spending vary across
single-party governments and coalition governments, right and left-wing governments, as well as with
the level of public debt.
2.3 Fiscal Federalism in Germany
The German federal system consists of three levels of government – the federal government, the
state governments, and the municipal governments. Each level is endowed with its own legislative
competencies and responsibilities, as specied by the German Constitution. Since the German reuni-
cation in 1990, there have been 16 German states (Bundesländer). Three of these 16 are so-called city-
states (Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg), which combine state and municipal-level competencies. The
competencies assigned to the German states are extensive and mainly dened in Articles 71 to 74 of the
constitution. They include policy areas such as public safety, education, infrastructure, social security,
administration, and health.
Although equipped with far-reaching legislative competencies, scal autonomy at the state-level is
restricted. While enjoying full discretion about the level and priorities of public spending (at least in
those policy areas for which they are responsible), the German states have scarcely any tax setting au-
thority. With few exceptions, taxes are levied and tax revenues are collected by the federal government.
In order to ensure that each state has sucient means to perform its functions and to harmonise living
conditions across all 16 German states, tax revenues are allocated across states applying a multi-step
mechanism (the so-called Ländernanzausgleich or inter-state scal equalization scheme).
In a rst step, the vertical allocation mechanism, tax revenues from the income tax, corporate tax,
capital gains tax, and value added tax are allocated across dierent levels of government according to
xed ratios. For example, the federal government and the state governments each receive 42.5 per cent
of the income tax, 50 per cent of the corporate tax, and 44 per cent of the capital gains tax. With regard
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to the value added tax, the federal government receives 51.4 per cent and the state governments 46.4 per
cent of the revenues. The remainder is for the municipal governments. Revenues from some other tax
measures are fully allocated either to the federal government (for instance energy and tobacco taxes) or
the state governments (such as inheritance tax).
In the second step, the horizontal allocation mechanism, each single state’s share in the total amount
of tax revenues allocated to the state-level is determined. Income tax revenues are distributed in order
to roughly match the amount of taxes paid by each state’s inhabitants. The allocation of corporate tax
revenues follows a similar principle. Each state’s share in total corporate tax revenues depends on the
amount of taxes paid by the rms who have their headquarters or aliated production units in that
state. The allocation of VAT revenues largely serves the purpose of harmonising tax revenues across
states. Up to 25 per cent of the total VAT revenues are assigned to those states that have received below-
average per capita tax revenues from other tax sources. The rest is distributed according to the number
of inhabitants in each state.
The inter-state scal equalization scheme comprises a third and fourth step, which both aim at
further mitigating the dierences in per capita tax revenues across states. In the third step, states with
higher than average per capita tax revenues pay transfers to states with below-average per capita tax
revenues. This redistributive scheme is justied by the fact that each state is believed to require nancial
resources of a comparable level in order to properly fulll its functions. As a nal step, the federal
government pays vertical grants to those states that still have below-average nancial resources.
In 2017, the sum of tax revenues allocated to the German states was roughly 300 billion Euro, which
is only slightly below the level of tax revenues of the federal government (approx. 310 billion Euro). The
tax revenues of German municipalities amounted to some 105 billion Euro. Thus, the state governments
possess more than 40 per cent of total tax revenues collected in Germany.
The only channel available to state governments to inuence tax legislation is through the Second
Federal Chamber, that is, the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat represents the interests of the state govern-
ments vis-à-vis the federal government. Its members are not elected, and are instead delegated by the
state governments. In general, the extent to which the Bundesrat participates in the legislation process
depends on the nature of the proposed legislation. Legislation aecting states’ interests requires the
approval of the Bundesrat (so-called ‘Consent Bills’). This includes legislation on all taxes where the
states (or local governments) participate in revenues (Art. 105 III, German Constitution). In principle,
the Bundesrat may also propose changes or amendments to (tax) bills introduced by the federal govern-
ment. However, it is ultimately the German Federal Parliament that decides whether changes proposed
by the Bundesrat will be adopted.
2.4 Constructing an Exogenous Tax Shock Series
We adopt the narrative approach pioneered by Romer and Romer (2009) in order to identify the
causal eect of tax shocks on scal policy outcomes. Over the past years, the narrative approach has
become a popular tool to investigate the impact of legislated tax changes on macroeconomic aggregates,
especially GDP (see Romer and Romer, 2010, for the US, Cloyne, 2013, for the UK and Hayo and Uhl,
2014, for Germany). As a starting point, we collect information on all discretionary changes in the fed-
eral tax legislation in Germany over the period from 1988 to 2011, together with the expected impact
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of each legislated tax change on tax revenues. Our source of information is the Finanzbericht (scal
report), which is the Federal Ministry of Finance’s annual publication. The Finanzbericht contains de-
tailed information on every piece of tax legislation, including (i) the date the tax bill was passed, (ii) the
motivation and objective behind the tax bill, and (iii) forecasts of the annual revenue impact over the
coming years for each level of government; for instance federal, state, and municipal level. Note that
the forecasts for the state and municipal level represent aggregates, in other words, the Finanzbericht
reports the prospected cumulative revenue impact for all states and municipalities combined.
We proceed in several steps in order to construct a measure of exogenous tax shocks. First, we assign
each piece of tax legislation to one out of seven dierent categories, depending on the motivation behind
the tax bill, thereby, closely following the schemes applied in Romer and Romer (2010), Cloyne (2013),
and Hayo and Uhl (2014). By rules of the parliamentary procedure, the motivation for any tax change
needs to be explained in detail in the draft bill.
The rst category comprises tax changes primarily intended to stabilise supply or demand-driven
uctuations in aggregate output. We label these tax measures ‘counter-cyclical’. There are several
examples of tax changes falling into this category, most prominently the scal stimuli packages that were
implemented during the economic and nancial crisis in 2010 (Konjunkturpaket; economic stimulus
package).4
The second category are ‘spending-driven’ tax changes. This label refers to tax measures that are
implemented in anticipation of higher future public expenditure over the short and mid-term. Examples
include the increase in taxes on cigarettes in 2003, explicitly adopted with the aim of nancing the ght
against international terrorism. Related to this are tax measures that were implemented in order to
consolidate public nances. These ‘decit-driven’ tax changes merely constitute tax hikes. A prime
example is the value-added tax increase (the VAT rate rose from 16 per cent to 19 per cent) of 2006 with
a prospected rise in public revenues of roughly 24 billion Euro each year.
Fourth, some policy measures were taken in response to ‘macroeconomic-shocks’, such as German
reunication and the introduction of the Euro as a common currency in Europe. In 2000, for example,
the German government issued a bill converting and rounding amounts denoted in the German tax law
in Deutsche Mark (such as allowances or income thresholds important for determining tax rates) into
Euro amounts.
The fth category includes tax changes adopted in an attempt to steer taxpayers’ behaviour into the
desired direction (‘Pigou taxes’). The intention behind this type of tax is generally to force taxpayers
to internalise some sort of externality. Most of the tax bills falling into this category are environmental
taxes.
Our sixth category is for tax measures that were implemented for ‘structural reasons’. This label ap-
plies to tax instruments intended to improve the long-term economic conditions, while being unrelated
to the contemporary economic situation at the same time. Examples include tax measures that aim to
reduce the bureaucratic burden of taxation for rms or to improve conditions for private investments.
Seventh, some tax changes reect the transposition of EU law into national legislation, or they are
passed due to a ruling of the European Court of Justice. For instance, in 2010, a bill was introduced ex-
4Cloyne (2013) explicitly distinguishes between demand and supply-driven tax policy reactions within this broader cat-
egory of ‘counter-cyclical’ tax policy measures. This distinction is not important for our purpose, as we are only concerned
with the identication of exogenous tax measures.
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tending the possibility to deduct donations to Germany-based charitable organisations from the taxable
income to donations directed to charitable organisations based in other EU countries. Introducing these
tax bills into national legislation is compulsory and the German government generally has only little –
if any – leeway with regard to the details of the law’s content. Those tax bills are typically intended to
harmonise tax legislation across EU member states.
In a second step, we classify each tax category as either endogenous or exogenous. In the process,
we closely follow the examples of Romer and Romer (2009), Cloyne (2013), and Hayo and Uhl (2014).
Discretionary tax changes that can be unambiguously labelled as exogenous, should not be correlated
with factors that may concurrently aect government spending and revenues. One example of a tax
category that clearly fails to meet this criterion are counter-cyclical tax measures. Tax cuts (tax hikes)
implemented during downturns (upswings), tend to be accompanied by spending hikes (cuts) so as to
amplify the impact of the scal stimulus (contraction). Moreover, automatic stabilisers mechanically
trigger expenditure adjustments in the presence of business cycle uctuations, and therefore coincide
with counter-cyclical tax measures. However, they are not caused by tax changes.
In addition, exogenous tax changes must not automatically entail decisions about public expendi-
ture or be triggered by them. Tax hikes adopted for the purpose of nancing a specic government
programme for instance, clearly violate this condition, and thus, must be considered endogenous. Tax
hikes that aim at consolidating public nances, on the other hand, may be inversely related to spend-
ing changes. Hence, including these tax changes would most certainly induce a downward bias in our
coecient estimates. All remaining tax changes are labelled as exogenous for two reasons. Firstly,
they are neither the result of changes in public expenditure, nor are they related to economic or scal
variables that aect tax revenues and public expenditure at the same time. Secondly, since they reect
decisions taken at the federal government-level and are, thus, ‘externally’ imposed, they are unrelated
to the political situation in the state where the revenue ‘shock’ occurs.
Finally, for each year of our sample period, we compute the aggregated revenue impact of past and
present exogenous tax changes. For each tax measure, the Finanzbericht, a yearly report about public
nances in Germany, includes the forecasted annual revenue impact for k consecutive years, with k
varying across publications and tax changes. We simply add up the tax revenue changes projected for
year t of all tax measures adopted between t and t − k . Therefore, our exogenous (indicated with x ) tax




∆τ xt |t−j ,
where ∆τt |t−j is the sum of tax revenue changes projected for year t across all tax measures introduced
in year t − j.
Note that, in contrast to Hayo and Uhl (2014), who omit tax measures with a prospected revenue im-
pact of less than 0.1 per cent of GDP from their analysis, our analysis includes all pieces of tax legislation
that are adopted during our sample period. The reason is that several tax changes are introduced each
year and we are interested in their cumulative impact. Even if each single tax measure implemented in
a particular year has a rather modest impact on tax revenues, the cumulative eect of all tax changes
introduced that year may be large enough to exert a signicant inuence on the public budget. In total,
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Figure 2.1: The Series of Exogenous Tax Revenue Shocks at the State-Level
The resulting exogenous tax shock series is depicted in Figure 2.1 with the projected per capita tax
revenue changes at the state-level in constant prices on the vertical axis. We can see that the projected
aggregate revenue change is positive in only ve out of 21 years. Moreover, in those ve years, the pro-
jected increase was of rather modest size. A very similar picture emerges when focusing on the single
tax bills. We nd that around two thirds of the exogenous tax changes are estimated to have a negative
revenue impact. What is more, on average the projected revenue impact of negative tax shocks is larger
than that of positive tax shocks (in absolute terms). Some years stand out in this context: substantial
drops in tax revenues in our exogenous tax shock series in the early and mid-2000s are mostly driven by
structural changes in labour, as well as corporate prot taxation predominantly enacted in the year 2000
when the economy experienced strong growth. The corresponding tax bills were intended to spur do-
mestic demand and private investment over the longer-term. Similarly, the negative tax revenue shocks
of 2007/08 that we label exogenous, were not a reaction to the upcoming nancial and economic crisis
but instead reect an accumulation of smaller tax changes aimed at changing the long-run conditions.
For example, the largest tax change in terms of revenue impact at that time emanates from the introduc-
tion of tax deduction possibilities for private pension plans. This instrument was implemented in light
of the projected demographic change over the coming decades. Clearly, these changes are not driven
by contemporary economic conditions but focus on solving longer-term challenges.
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2.5 Conditions for Causal Inference
The aim of our analysis is to identify the causal eect of changes in tax revenues on the scal
policy of German state governments in order to empirically test the starving the beast hypothesis. The
following conditions must apply in order for our identication strategy to be valid.
2.5.1 Accuracy of Revenue Projections
Tax projection experts at the Federal Ministry of Finance provide the revenue projections reported
in the Finanzbericht. Unfortunately, there is little information on how and on which basis they are ob-
tained. Given that we use these projections to construct our key explanatory variable, our identication
strategy depends on the accuracy of these projections. In order to assess their accuracy, we regress the
absolute change in state tax revenues per capita on our exogenous tax shock series. Table 2.1 shows
the regression results for dierent specications of the regression model. Since the point estimate of
the contemporary eect of the tax shock series is close to one across all three specications (and never
signicantly dierent from one, as the bottom row of Table 2.1 indicates), we have no reason to be-
lieve that the ministry’s projections are systematically biased. We are therefore condent that they are
suciently precise for our purpose.





linear trend 8 X X
quadr. trend 8 8 X
Observations 224 224 224
R2 0.049 0.051 0.059
H0: β∆τ xt = 1 p = 0.67 p = 0.64 p = 0.65
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors which are displayed in brackets below. The coef-
cient of the constant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.1: Accuracy of Revenue Projections from the Annual Fiscal Report of the Ministry of Finance
2.5.2 Exogeneity of Tax Shock Series
To establish a causal link between changes in tax revenues and public expenditures, it is important
that our tax shock series is unrelated to the underlying economic and scal conditions. Applying the
narrative approach ensures that the tax changes we consider are not motivated by current economic
conditions. What about the timing of those tax changes, however? Even if a tax change may not be mo-
tivated by the current economic situation, policymakers might still take the business cycle into account
when making decision on the timing of a tax change. For instance, policymakers may be reluctant to
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implement tax hikes during downturns or tax cuts during upswings, which would render our identi-
cation strategy invalid. However, when comparing the realisations of our tax shock series depicted in
Figure 2.1 to contemporary income growth rates, it becomes evident that the tax changes we consider
to be exogenous are not related to business cycle uctuations. Some of the largest negative tax shocks
have been adopted in ‘normal’ economic times characterised by income growth rates that are close to
the sample average. For example, in the early 1990s, income growth was about 1.5 per cent p.a., and
in the early 2000s it was roughly 1.9 per cent. Other peaks in the tax shock series seem to be evenly
distributed across economic downturns and upswings. In 2005, when the German economy reached
the height of an upswing phase with an annual income growth rate of 3.8 per cent, a large negative
tax shock occurred. The next sizable negative tax change was implemented in 2009, at a time Germany
was still suering from the repercussions of the nancial and economic crisis, and income growth was
negative.
2.5.3 No Anticipation Eects
Another concern that may be raised is that state governments might anticipate future tax changes
and adjust public spending in advance, not least because they could potentially inuence the legislation
process through the Second Federal Chamber, for example the Bundesrat (see section 2.3). State gov-
ernments’ ability to inuence tax legislation may raise concerns about reverse causality. The question
arises whether states adjust their expenditure in anticipation of future tax changes, which they could
potentially inuence. To test the validity of this concern, we regress our tax shock series on contem-
porary and past changes in state public expenditure per capita.5 The results are presented in Table 2.2.
Our ndings do not indicate that state governments anticipate future tax changes. The coecient esti-
mates for present and past changes in public spending are not only statistically insignicant, but also
economically negligible. Thus, we are condent that reverse causality is not an issue.
2.6 Empirical Approach
Our aim is to evaluate the inuence of legislated tax changes on scal policy outcomes. To this end,
we utilise panel data from the German states spanning the years from 19926 to 2011, the latest year for
which state-level scal data are currently available.7 We estimate the following empirical model:








γjyit−j + Xitδ + ϵ1t + ϵ2t
2 (2.1)
The index t refers to the year, and i to the state. In our baseline specication, the dependent variable
is the absolute change in total public spending per capita. As part of an extension, we also focus on
5Note that according to Reutter (2007), the time span between the initiation of a bill and its adoption is, on average, 250
days. In fact, all the tax bills covered in our analysis became eective the year after they were introduced to parliament.
Therefore, we believe that it is sucient to control for the rst lag of public expenditure in order to test for reverse causality.
6Note that state-level forecasts of the revenue impact of tax changes are only reported from 1988 onwards. In the Fi-
nanzbericht of 1988, revenue forecasts are provided for the years from 1988 to 1992. Thus, if we were to utilise data from
before 1992 in our analysis, we would not take into account the estimated state-level revenue impact of tax measures intro-
duced before 1988.
7State-level scal data are published with a considerable time-lag as the variables need to be made comparable across
states by the Federal Statistical Oce.
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linear trend 8 X X
quadr. trend 8 8 X
Observations 224 224 224
R2 0.002 0.203 0.303
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors which are displayed in brackets below. The
coecient of the constant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.2: Reverse Causality Check: The Impact of Spending Adjustments on the Tax Revenue Shock Series
public spending in dierent policy areas (see Section 2.8.2). Our explanatory variable of main interest is
our measure for exogenous tax shocks ∆τ x . As described in Section 2.4, our tax shock indicator is equal
to the sum of the changes in tax revenues projected for year t across all tax changes adopted between
t and t − k . Since for most volumes of the Finanzbericht, k is equal to four (and never smaller), our
empirical model includes four lags of the tax shock variable. Xit is a vector of state-specic covariates.
This vector includes the level of net income per capita, the unemployment rate, the level of public debt
per capita, the dependency ratio (for example, the share of people below 25 or above 65 years of age),
as well as dummy variables for election years, coalition governments, and left-wing governments (such
as governments led by the Social Democratic Party). Note that net income, the unemployment rate, and
the level of public debt are lagged by one year to mitigate concerns about reverse causality. In order to
account for gradual budget adjustments, we also include the four lags of the dependent variable in our
empirical model. To test whether the coecient estimates of our tax shock series are sensitive to the
inclusion of additional explanatory variables, we consecutively add the lags of the dependent variable
and the vector of covariates to our empirical specication. Finally, we add a linear and a quadratic
time trend to our model to account for homogeneous trends. Data on all scal and economic variables
are provided by the Federal Statistical Oce (Statistisches Bundesamt), while the political variables are
taken from the State Election Commissioners (Landeswahlleiter). The economic and scal variables are
adjusted for ination using the national CPI.8 We estimate Equation 2.1 using ordinary least squares
(OLS).
Given that the Finanzbericht only reports forecasts of the aggregate tax revenue eect for all German
states combined, we need to make an assumption about how the aggregate tax revenue eect inuences
the budgets of individual states. Since, generally speaking, the allocation of tax revenues across states
is primarily determined by the number of citizens residing in a state, we divide our tax shock variable
by national population gures and our dependent variables by state population gures. That way, we
8The base year is 2000; the data are also taken from the Federal Statistical Oce.
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implicitly assume that the change in tax revenues in each state resulting from a legislated tax change,
is proportional to its number of inhabitants (and that the per capita revenue impact of a legislated tax
change does not vary across states).
Three of the 16 German states are so-called city states (Stadtstaaten), namely Berlin, Bremen, and
Hamburg. These states adopt functions at both the state and local government-level. As a result, they
receive tax revenues designated for the state and local level, which is why the tax shock series for the
city states combines prospected changes in tax revenues at both state and the municipal level.9
Since we use the rst dierence of public spending as the dependent variable, the coecients βj
can be interpreted as the tax shock-induced deviations of state-level public spending from its long-
term trend. In the full model that includes net income and the unemployment rate as covariates, the
dependent variable can be interpreted as the cyclically-adjusted long-term trend in public spending.
Note that the inclusion of a linear and a quadratic time trend in our empirical model implies that we
allow the trend to vary over time.
The lack of precision with which the state-level revenue impact of a tax shock is measured, repre-
sents an important limitation for our empirical analysis. Our tax shock series is constructed based on
forecasts of the aggregate revenue impact of legislated tax changes across all 16 states. Nevertheless, as
witnessed in Section 2.5, those forecasts appear to be accurate on average, yet we know nothing about
how well they predict the revenue changes in each individual state. Thus, our independent variable of
main interest is likely measured with noise. Consequently, under the classical errors-in-variables as-
sumption, our estimates of βj will suer from an attenuation bias, meaning that they are biased toward
zero. Our estimates can thus be interpreted as a lower bound of the true parameter βj .
2.7 Results
The estimation results for Equation 2.1 are presented in Table 2.3. The rst column of Table 2.3 shows
the estimates when omitting the AR(4) term and the covariates, the second column when omitting only
the covariates, and the third column for the full model. Our results indicate a strong and statistically
signicant impact of legislated tax changes on aggregate spending at the state-level. However, spending
adjustments only occur with a signicant delay. According to our estimates, an increase (decrease) in
tax revenues by one Euro is associated with an increase (decrease) in public spending by 0.40 to 0.70
Euro two years after the occurrence of the tax shock, and by another 0.40 to 0.70 Euro after three years.
Note that for each specication, the sum of signicant coecients never substantially diers from one,
implying that any tax hike (tax cut) is followed by an increase (a reduction) in public spending of the
same amount over the long-run. The delayed reaction of public spending after a legislated tax change,
suggests a delay in political decision-making. State governments take time to adapt to revenue change
and agree on an adjustment of public spending.
9Our baseline results in Table 2.3 do not change if we also include municipality-level revenue projections for all other
states.
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Dep. variable:

















AR(4) 8 X X
Covariates 8 8 X
linear trend X X X
quadr. trend X X X
Observations 224 218 218
R2 0.125 0.193 0.341
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard errors which are displayed in brackets below.
The coecient of the constant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.3: Baseline Regressions: The Impact of Revenue Shocks on Aggregate Spending
2.8 Extensions and Robustness Checks
2.8.1 Heterogeneous Spending Adjustments
Tax Hikes vs. Tax Cuts
We do not dierentiate between tax hikes and tax cuts in our baseline specication. Instead, we
study their eects combined. The starving the beast hypothesis, however, suggests exclusively focusing
on tax cuts. In addition, Figure 2.1 of Section 2.4 illustrates that our sample mainly comprises tax cuts.
In fact, tax hikes have been a rare event during our sample period, and if they did occur, they have only
been of modest size. In light of that, it seems natural to merely focus on the eect of tax cuts. To this
end, we re-estimate Equation 2.1 after omitting all tax hikes from our sample. The results are presented
in the second column of Table 2.4. To facilitate the comparison with our baseline estimates, the rst
column of Table 2.4 replicates the results from our baseline specication.
The ndings indicate that state governments appear to react faster to a tax cut than a tax hike. When
omitting tax hikes from our sample, we see a statistically and economically signicant adjustment in
public spending one year after a tax shock occurs. Moreover, the coecient estimates for the rst
three lags of our tax shock series become notably larger when only focusing on tax cuts. The sum
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of signicant coecient estimates is roughly equal to 2.6, thus indicating that the decrease in public
spending far exceeds the magnitude of the tax cut.10 A possible explanation is that state governments
seek to repay the debt they incurred due to the delayed adjustment of public spending. On the whole,
our ndings lend strong support to the starving the beast hypothesis.
Dep. variable:
Aggr. Spending per capita

















linear trend X X
quadr. trend X X
Observations 218 218
R2 0.193 0.239
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use het-
eroskedasticity robust standard errors which are displayed in
brackets below. The coecient of the constant is omitted to
ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.4: The Impact of Exogenous Tax Revenue Cuts on Aggregate Spending
Highly vs. Modestly Indebted States
The degree of exibility governments have when it comes to decisions about public spending de-
pends on the level of public debt. It is typically assumed that the marginal costs of public debt increase
with the level of debt. This implies that a high debt level restricts the government’s room for manoeuvre
and forces the government to react faster to a negative tax shock. To test this conjecture, we construct
a dummy variable that takes the value one if a state’s level of public debt in a given year is above the
sample median and zero otherwise. Subsequently, we interact this dummy variable with our tax shock
series in order to estimate separate coecients for highly and modestly indebted states. The results are
presented in Table 2.5. The coecient estimates for highly and modestly indebted states are virtually
10The lower and upper bound of the 95 per cent condence interval is [1.6; 3.7].
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identical and scarcely dier from one another. Thus, our conjecture is not supported by the data. Note
that this conclusion does not change when exclusively focusing on tax cuts.11
Dep. variable:
Aggr. Spending per capita
High Low

















linear trend X X
quadr. trend X X
Observations 218 218
R2 0.278 0.278
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use het-
eroskedasticity robust standard errors which are dis-
played in brackets below. The coecient of the con-
stant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.5: The Impact of Revenue Shocks on Aggregate Spending for States with High and Low Debt Levels
Single-Party vs. Coalition Governments
Another potentially important factor that may aect a government’s reaction to a tax shock, is a
phenomenon referred to as the ‘war of attrition’ (e.g., Poterba and von Hagen, 1999, and Persson and
Tabellini, 1999). Here, the argument is that divided governments or coalition governments have an in-
centive to delay an adjustment in response to a scal shock because they have dierent preferences
regarding the measures of adjustment. For example, in the event of a tax shock, the parties forming
a coalition may opt for spending hikes or cuts in dierent policy areas. The rst party that concedes
will alienate its constituents and thus bear a larger share of the political costs associated with spend-
ing adjustment. This is why each party tries to outlive the other(s) (Padovano and Venturi, 2001). For
that reason, we would expect that single-party governments adjust public spending faster than coali-
tion governments when a tax shock occurs. To test this hypothesis, we combine our tax shock series
with a dummy variable that adopts the value one for coalition governments and zero for single-party
11Results available on request.
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governments. We thus obtain separate coecient estimates for both types of government. Our results
do not support the ‘war of attrition’ hypothesis since the coecients are virtually identical (see Table
2.6).
Dep. variable:


















linear trend X X
quadr. trend X X
Observations 218 218
R2 0.209 0.209
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use het-
eroskedasticity robust standard errors which are dis-
played in brackets below. The coecient of the con-
stant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.6: The Impact of Revenue Shocks on Aggregate Spending for States with and without Coalition
Governments
Dierences between Left-Wing and Right-Wing Governments
Finally, we investigate whether left (for example, governments led by the Social Democratic Party;
SPD) and right-wing (such as governments led by the Christian Democratic Union; CDU) governments
react dierently to tax shocks. We do so by interacting the tax shock variable with a dummy for left-wing
governments. A rst glance at the coecients presented in Table 2.7 suggests that left-wing and right-
wing governments dier with regard to the timing of spending adjustments. Two years after a tax cut,
left-wing governments appear to have fully adjusted public spending (in other words the decrease in tax
revenues is mitigated by a decrease in public spending of the same amount). Right-wing governments,
however, seem to require three years to reduce public spending by the amount necessary to balance the
44
Chapter 2. Tax Cuts Starve the Beast: Evidence from Germany
budget. It is worth noting, though, that despite the dierences in their magnitudes, the coecients do
not signicantly dier from one another at conventional levels of signicance.12
Dep. variable:



















linear trend X X
quadr. trend X X
Observations 218 218
R2 0.220 0.220
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use het-
eroskedasticity robust standard errors which are dis-
played in brackets below. The coecient of the con-
stant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.7: The Impact of Revenue Shocks on Aggregate Spending for States for Left- and Right-Wing Gov-
ernments
2.8.2 Spending on Sub-Categories
Until now, we have focused on the eects of legislated tax changes on aggregate public spending.
Our ndings provide strong support for the starving the beast hypothesis. They suggest that tax cuts are
associated with reductions in public spending of a similar amount. However, the pending question is in
which policy areas public spending is reduced in response to a tax cut. To answer this question, we re-
estimate Equation 2.1 using per capita spending in dierent policy areas as the dependent variable. We
focus on eight dierent policy areas: public administration, education, public safety and legal protection,
health, infrastructure, social security, science, and culture. These are the largest spending items in
German state government budgets.
12The p-value for a test of the null that the coecient of the second lag of the tax shock variable is the same for left and
right-wing governments is 0.193.
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The results are shown in Table 2.8. To economise on space, we only report the results for those
policy areas for which we nd robust signicant eects.13 Our ndings indicate that both the timing as
well as magnitude of the adjustment in public spending varies considerably across the dierent policy
areas. We see particularly large adjustments to tax shocks in public spending for administration and
social security. Depending on the specication, the estimates suggest that an increase (a decrease) in
tax revenues by one Euro triggers an increase (a reduction) in spending on administration by 0.30 Euro
to 0.45 Euro in total. The adjustment in social security spending is of a similar amount. However, while
spending on public administration is already reduced the year after a tax change is realised, the change
in social security spending only occurs two to three years after the tax shock. Arguably, the dierence
with regard to the timing of the adjustment indicates that spending on social security is more prevalent
than spending on public administration.
Dep. variable: Spending per capita on ...
Administration Health Infrastructure Social Security
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
∆τ xt
0.135** 0.088 0.020 0.024 0.091** 0.097 0.061 −0.022
(0.059) (0.058) (0.025) (0.026) (0.046) (0.062) (0.102) (0.098)
∆τ xt−1
0.315*** 0.297*** 0.018 0.022 0.090** 0.094 −0.003 −0.111
(0.077) (0.065) (0.031) (0.033) (0.051) (0.070) (0.112) (0.120)
∆τ xt−2
0.038 −0.003 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.083 0.086 0.153* 0.043
(0.078) (0.073) (0.031) (0.032) (0.054) (0.238) (0.081) (0.088)
∆τ xt−3
−0.005 −0.037 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.024 0.027 0.348*** 0.251***
(0.055) (0.051) (0.029) (0.029) (0.055) (0.065) (0.098) (0.095)
∆τ xt−4
−0.007 −0.036 0.019 0.014 0.104** 0.101** 0.110 0.076
(0.059) (0.057) (0.018) (0.018) (0.041) (0.043) (0.068) (0.064)
AR(4) X X X X X X X X
Covariates 8 X 8 X 8 X 8 X
linear trend X X X X X X X X
quadr. trend X X X X X X X X
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
R2 0.480 0.551 0.227 0.254 0.178 0.206 0.255 0.292
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use heteroskedasticity robust standard errors which are displayed in brackets
below. The coecient of the constant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2.8: The Impact of Revenue Shocks on Spending on Specic Sub-Categories
Aggregate spending on infrastructure features smaller spending increases in the beginning, and
slightly more generous spending over the longer term. This is not surprising since many construction
projects require considerable time for planning. Spending increases in the longer run, for example after
four years by around 0.10 Euro per capita.
13All additional results are available on request.
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We conducted the same exercise for additional expenditure categories. These include spending on
education, science, legal protection, and public safety as well as culture. Point estimates for the im-
pact of exogenous revenue changes for spending on these categories, were not statistically signicantly
dierent from zero at the ve per cent level.
2.9 A Note on External Validity
Does a decline in tax revenue lead to a decline in public spending, as implied by the starving the beast
hypothesis? Or does it cause higher decits and subsequently higher taxes but no change in spending,
as suggested by Romer and Romer (2009)? Our analysis of the scal consequences of tax shocks at the
state-level in Germany supports the starving the beast hypothesis. It is important, though, to interpret
our ndings in light of the specic institutional framework of German scal federalism. German states
have little tax autonomy. They cannot react to today’s tax cuts by borrowing more and raising taxes
tomorrow. Yet, they have other margins of adjustment. They could borrow more and lobby for higher
taxes at the federal level. Or they could rely on future bailouts by the federal government. We can
see that they prefer to cut spending. There are some federal states whose tax autonomy is also limited
and tax sharing arrangements dominate. Examples include Austria and Belgium. In other federations
like the US, Canada, and Switzerland, the states have more tax autonomy, and federal bailouts are less
likely. In this type of institutional environment, the revenue shocks may result in dierent spending
reactions. To shed some light on this issue, it is interesting to look at the literature on the so-called
‘ypaper eect’ (Courant et al., 1979 and Hines and Thaler, 1995), which observes that unconditional
federal grants received by US states usually lead to higher spending but not to tax cuts. Standard theory
would predict a combination of both. This observation could be interpreted as an indirect conrmation
of the starving the beast hypothesis – provided that the reaction to changes in grants is symmetric.
2.10 Conclusions
The present chapter empirically tests the validity of the starving the beast hypothesis. According to
this hypothesis, government spending can be restrained by limiting tax revenues. This conjecture relies
on the argument that tax cuts commit the government to enact spending cuts in order to ensure that
scal policy remains sustainable over the long-run.
In our empirical analysis, we use data from the German states covering the period from 1992 to
2011. We take advantage of the fact that the institutional setting of German scal federalism is ideally
suited to study the consequences of tax changes for public spending. While the German states have full
discretion about the level and priorities of public spending as well as the level of debt nancing, they
have an almost complete lack of tax setting autonomy. Both tax rates and tax bases are determined at
the federal level. We use ocial governmental publications to compile a list of almost 130 legislated tax
changes in Germany – each of them carefully classied by motivation in order to identify those that are
unambiguously exogenous with respect to other economic or political uctuations – together with the
corresponding projected tax revenue changes for the states. We then use these projected tax revenue
changes to study the causal inuence of tax cuts on aggregate public spending, as well as spending in
eight dierent policy areas.
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We nd that legislated tax changes have a strong and positive impact on state governments’ ag-
gregate expenditures. Our results suggest that a one Euro decrease in tax revenues leads to a decrease
in public spending of about the same amount. However, it takes up to two or three years until the
spending cut occurs. Our ndings thus support the starving the beast hypothesis. Moreover, our results
stand up against the inclusion of a range of important state-level covariates. Furthermore, with regard
to the timing or size of the scal adjustment, we do not identify notable dierences between unied and
divided governments, left-wing and right-wing governments as well as across states with high versus
low levels of debt.
When focusing on the structure of public spending, we nd substantial dierences across spend-
ing categories. While spending on public administration decreases immediately and substantially in
response to a tax cut, health, social security, and infrastructure-related expenditure appears to decline
only in the longer term, and in the case of spending on health and infrastructure to a minor extent.
Education spending is largely unaected. That undermines the widespread view that pressures to cut
spending are counter-productive because governments respond by reducing public investment.
These results should be interpreted in light of the specic institutional setting of German scal
federalism. German states have very limited tax autonomy and cannot react to revenue shocks by
changing tax rates individually. They can only try to push for collective tax changes at the federal
level or increase debt nancing. In other federations with more tax autonomy at the state-level, state
governments may behave dierently.
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Chapter 3
The Quality of Local Public Good Provision and Electoral
Support
3.1 Introduction
Do voters take into consideration the quality of public services when going to the polls on election
day? This question is not easy to answer, particularly because it is challenging to nd an adequate met-
ric that captures the quality of local public good provision at a granular geographic level. Specically,
consider issues such as whether sidewalks are clean, whether park benches need repair or whether aban-
doned cars block streets. Thus, it is not surprising that little is known about the eect of the quality of
public service provision at the local level on electoral support of incumbent local politicians and parties.
While some studies examine this relationship at the national and sub-national level (see for example
Johnston and Pattie, 2001, Bartle, 2003 and Boyne et al., 2009), studies at the local level face data avail-
ability diculties which limit both their internal and external validity. Much of the existing literature
at the local level is restricted to city-specic case studies or cross-sectional variation therein, casting
doubts on the generalizability of the results. For example, Burnett and Kogan (2017) exploit within-city
cross-neighborhood variation with respect to the number of pothole complaints and electoral behavior
in San Diego to identify the eect of pothole complaints on the vote share of the incumbent. Obviously,
these neighborhoods might dier in other characteristics that aect electoral outcomes, or causality
might be reversed. A second reason for concern relates to the choice of the outcome measure, which
often appears to be guided by data availability rather than sound economic theory. Many of these
outcomes used in retrospective voting, especially in the context of public services, are not necessarily
salient to voters and may be poor measures of the actual quality of public good provision. For example,
Arnold and Carnes (2012) use the number of city employees as a proxy for municipal service quality
and nd no eect on approval ratings of New York City mayors. It is unclear whether this is due to the
fact that the number of local city employees is an inadequate proxy for the actual quality of municipal
services, whether voters are unaware of the number of local administrative employees, or whether it
is indeed irrelevant to their judgement. The same holds true for other approaches based on the size of
the local council budget or its specic budget distribution across various spending categories, as used,
for example, by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2015) and Litschig and Morrison (2012). Instead, it would be more
convincing to focus on specic outcomes that are more visible to voters since they are more likely to
retrospectively evaluate the work of the local council based on their daily experiences (Popkin, 1994).
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Against this backdrop, this paper breaks new ground by deriving a new proxy for public goods and
service provision at the local level that allows for a more rigorous testing of the eect in a more general
econometric framework that is not limited to specic cities. I use complaints posted on the complaint-
platform FixMyStreet.com. This platform is particularly popular in the United Kingdom with more than
2 million complaints posted to date since its launch in early 2007. Meanwhile, the platform is available
for all regions in the UK and forms an integral part of the local complaint management infrastructure.
Via their posts, users can alert their local authorities to problems such as potholes, broken streetlights,
grati, abandoned cars, ypaper etc. Complaints are automatically geo-located by the application on
the cell-phone and can thus be directly assigned to specic neighborhoods. Between May 2007 and
May 2015, the dates of major local elections in the United Kingdom, around 600,000 posts were made
by users in England. I use these observations for all 7678 wards of the country, the most disaggregated
geographic area in the United Kingdom, to compute granular performance measures over four-year
pre-election horizons based on how quickly these complaints are resolved by the local authority. The
share of complaints not resolved after 12 months, which I use as an indicator for the quality of public
services, is, as expected, negatively correlated with various municipal expenditure items, e.g., local waste
management, and the number of employees in the public sector.
By leveraging within-neighborhood variation of the quality indicator over time, I show that these
local performance measures are indeed highly relevant to the re-election of the local incumbent party in
subsequent local elections. The estimation results provide compelling evidence for a strong punishment
eect by voters: Parties in neighborhoods with better performance measures, i.e. with a relatively
smaller share of complaints not resolved, also have higher re-election chances. The eect seems to be
particularly strong for the quick removal of dog excrement and y-tipping and is robust to various xed
eects specications that account for both time-constant neighborhood characteristics and time-varying
trends at the regional level.
This study draws on the online activity of citizens holding service providers accountable for the
quality of service they provide (see Andrabi et al., 2017, and Banerjee et al., 2007 for additional exam-
ples in dierent contexts). Greater citizen participation has traditionally been hampered by existing
practical constraints, in particular a lack of awareness of existing programs (Banerjee et al., 2010), and
low participation rates due to classic collective action problems (Barr et al., 2014), as well as nancial,
time, and even social burdens on citizens (see Grossman et al., 2017, and Blair et al.). The growing
availability of text-messaging platforms has signicantly facilitated the process of monitoring service
providers and providing feedback on their performances. Not only have they lowered the cost of partic-
ipation through (anonymous) reporting, but they have also made the interaction with authorities more
eective: While citizens are in a better position to judge the quality of provided services from their daily
experiences, elected ocials can enforce a higher quality of service delivery (Grossman et al., 2017).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief description of the
local governmental system in the United Kingdom and England in particular. Section 3.3 describes the
data on which the analysis is based and the computation of the quality indicators. Section 3.4 presents
the estimation strategy and the results, followed by a series of robustness checks in Section 3.5. Section
3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Local Electoral System in England
The structure of local government in the United Kingdom varies from area to area. For example,
in most parts of England, there are two tiers – namely regions and local authority districts, or rst
and second-tier – between which responsibilities for local council services are divided. London as well
as other metropolitan areas and some parts of shire England operate under a single tier structure that
combines local council responsibilities for all services in their area. The level below the district level
consists of roughly 8,500 so-called wards in the United Kingdom. Every ward elects councilors to be
members of the local city or district council. Figure 3.1 depicts the electoral structure in England with
districts highlighted in blue and wards highlighted in gray.
Note: Local Authorities are colored in blue and local wards are colored in gray.
Figure 3.1: Electoral Structure in England: Local Authorities and Wards
On average, each ward has an electorate of approximately 5,500 people, but ward population can
vary to some extent. In cases of larger ward population, the inhabitants of the ward can nominate
two, and in rare cases even three, local councilors so that the ratio of inhabitants per representative
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is kept approximately the same in all wards. If there is more than one vacant council seat, each party
can nominate two or three candidates to stand for election, except for independent candidates without
party aliation. Councilors are ordinary members of the public elected by the local residents only.
In this system, known as the ‘multi-member plurality system’, the candidate who received the most
votes wins. There is no proportional representation as known from local elections in other countries.
Councilors are usually elected for a period of four years. However, councils may be elected in full every
four years, or alternatively ‘by thirds’, with one third of the councilors elected each year and one year
without elections in between. Recently also the ‘by halves’ system has been allowed, in which half of
the council is elected every two years. Elections usually take place on the rst Thursday in May.1
The main task of a councilor is to represent his or her constituency in the next highest parliament.
Councilors play an important role in planning, implementing, monitoring and developing local council
activities. The competencies of local district, borough and city councils are far-reaching and include,
for example, waste collection, recycling practices, housing development, as well as other planning ap-
plications such as repair work or local infrastructure maintenance and development. It is these services
to which most of the requests on the online complaint platform relate. It is important to note that no
individual councilor has sole decision-making authority. Instead, day-to-day decisions are made at the
district-level by specic committees and the full Cabinet, which are made up of a number of councilors.
Therefore, the councilors do not directly deal with individual complaints, e.g. those from FixMyStreet.
Nevertheless, as observed by Dipoppa and Grossman (2020), many of the local civil servants who are
responsible for complaint management are appointed by councilors whose strategic decisions they ex-
ecute.2 Moreover, assuming that addressing reported complaints does not only increase re-election
chances of incumbent councilors but also the prospects of re-appointment of council sta, the incen-
tives of both should align closely in this respect.3
Local governments in England have limited revenue-raising options. Funding comes from a combi-
nation of business rates, dierent types of central government grants and local council taxes. Smaller
revenue sources include rents, fees and other charges at the local level. Earmarked central government
grants make the largest source of revenue for local authority districts. These ‘specic grants’ are in-
tended for specic purposes, such as the operation of local schools. ‘General grants’ make up a smaller
fraction of central government funding and can be spent by district councils on any service. In addition
to government grants, local authorities receive substantial funding from the ‘Business Rates Retention
Scheme’. These are taxes set by the central government and paid by occupants of non-domestic prop-
erties. Before 2013, revenues from business rates were collected by local councils and forwarded to
the Treasury before being redistributed to local authorities via central government grants. Since 2013,
councils have been allowed to retain up to 50% of these business rates revenues, with central grants
being adjusted accordingly. If the 50% share of the business rates retained at the local level is considered
too much or too little revenue in order to meet necessary spending requirements at the local level, the
1Electoral results at the ward level between 2007 and 2015 are retrieved from the Local Elections Archive Project (LEAP).
The results can be accessed online at www.andrewteale.me.uk.
2According to the Quarterly Public Sector Employment Survey by the Oce of National Statistics more than 12% of the
total local government sta in the UK was employed on a non-permanent contract in the rst quarter of 2015, with some local
councils employing more than 40% or even 50% of their employees on a temporary basis.
3Illustrative examples of councilors who documented their (supposedly positive) record of solving FixMyStreet complaints
on their professional websites can be found in Dipoppa and Grossman (2020).
52
Chapter 3. The Quality of Local Public Good Provision and Electoral Support
central government can impose a ‘tari’ or grant a ‘top-up’ in order to oset local spending capacity
to some extent. Additional revenues come from local council taxes which are intended to balance local
spending requirements and other revenues, in particular from the central government. Unlike the cen-
tral government, local councils cannot borrow money in order to cover their day-to-day expenses, i.e.
they must either maintain a balanced budget or draw on savings from previous years.
On the spending side, councils typically follow a 4-year planning cycle for their budgets. Major
budget decisions are debated and approved by the Cabinet, the main decision-making body at the district
level, in order to provide its local services and to maintain and develop local infrastructure. Central
government can exert pressure on local authorities if councils fail to provide local services according
to national standards, or if spending and council taxes increase substantially.4 Education, adult and
police services account for the largest spending items in local authorities’ annual budgets, followed by
expenditures on highways services. Much of the spending by local councils takes the form of earmarked
central government grants, as noted earlier. However, ‘general grants’ and other revenue sources give
councils leeway to prioritize specic budget categories over others by topping-up available resources.
3.3 Data and Quality Indicators of Local Public Good Provision
The analysis is based on all complaints that were posted on the app-based platform FixMy-Street.com
between May 2007 and May 2015, the dates of general local elections in the UK. Using the application
on their cell-phones, users can post complaints of various categories on the platform.5 To do so, users
rst enter a UK postcode or street address, or they can be located automatically. On the map, users can
then pinpoint the exact location of the incident and add a subject line, a category, a detailed description
and pictures. Once completed, the complaint report is forwarded, usually within minutes, to an email
address of the responsible local authority, including the specic geo-coordinates of the complaint.6 Users
do not need to register on the website, nor are they required to use their real name. Only a valid email
address must be used. Figure 3.2 shows an example of a complaint from the ‘Fly-Tipping’ category. The
description on the left side of the screen-shot shows when the complaint was posted (and by whom)
and if (and when) the complain twas solved by the local authority.
As Solymosi et al. (2017) note, users of FixMyStreet are also consumers of the platform in the sense
that they have an intrinsic interest in seeing their complaints resolved. Thus, it appears reasonable to
assume that the reporting mechanism creates sucient incentives for users to provide accurate infor-
mation, in particular with respect to the exact location of the incident, so that complaints can be solved
accurately and quickly.
In principle, complaints can be labeled as “solved” by all users, i.e. local council sta, the person
who posted the complaint or any other user of the app. Councils typically use ocial council accounts
with names such as “ Oxfordshire County Council”. Of the resolved complaints in this sample, 18% were
labeled as “solved” by a user with an alias containing the string “Council” (or “council”). In 38% of the
4For example, under the 2011 amendments to the Localism Act, the local council must hold a referendum on the proposal
if spending increases such that local council taxes must to be raised by more than 2% in order to maintain a balanced budget.
5In July 2017, MySociety, the charity organization that provides the open source software for the FixMyStreet platform,
reported that the application was downloaded 40,000 times in the UK: see their blog post at mysociety.org/2017/07/21/the-big-
one-million-celebrating-xmystreet.
6The email address needs to be added by the local authority when activating the service of the platform for its area.
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cases it was a person without an explicit user name (“Posted anonymously”, see also the example from
Figure 3.2) and the remaining 44% provided either their real names or variants of it. Thus, judging by the
users’ online names, councils appear to play only a minor role in reporting of resolved complaints on
the platform. Nevertheless, while less likely for users reporting problems, council sta responsible for
the communication on the platform but without specic knowledge of the status of repair work could
potentially lead to measurement errors in the online data used for this analysis. This could apply to
both the status of open complaints (xed or not?) and the date the repair work was completed (when
xed?). In this case, the resulting measurement error in the neighborhood-specic quality indicator
causes the parameter estimate in the linear regression model to be biased towards zero (Griliches and
Hausman, 1986). Econometric specications with unit xed-eects are particularly susceptible to this
‘attenuation bias’ when the true regressor, in this case the actual quality of local public good provision,
is (highly) correlated over time, while the measurement error is merely serially uncorrelated noise.
Despite the inherent advantage of avoiding bias from omitted time-consistent characteristics, the focus
on deviations from unit-specic means in the xed-eects specication removes much of the variation
in the variable of interest in this case. Of course, the xed-eects specication is particularly useful if the
measurement error is a xed eect in itself. For example, some ward’s or council’s complaint reporting
procedure might consistently over- or understate the true quality indicator by a constant share, say ten
percentage points. In this case, the inclusion of ward-specic xed eects completely eliminates the
measurement error in the regressor.
In addition to measurement errors, it is possible that problems are reported by multiple users un-
aware that these complaints have already been posted by others.7 To assess the extent of this potential
issue, I apply an algorithm that identies clusters of geographically close complaint items from the same
category (potholes, abandoned cars etc.) and from the same quarter of the year in order to group com-
plaints by time and category. The DBSCAN (short for Density-based spatial clustering with applications
and noise) technique, rst introduced by Ester et al., 1996, is particularly suitable for this exercise. The
algorithm treats the number of clusters as endogenous, i.e. it does not need to be specied a priori,
which is an inherent advantage over other algorithms in this context. Instead, the number of clusters
(of arbitrary shape) is derived from the data based on the parametrization of two critical factors: the
maximum distance between two points to be considered as belonging to the same geographic clus-
ter, and the minimum number of observations necessary to form a cluster. In this case, the minimum
number of complaints is set to 1, so that every post could potentially form a cluster on its own. What
remains to be assessed is its sensitivity to the maximum distance between geographic locations of the
complaint items. Table 3.1 summarizes the results the algorithm yields for various reasonable values of
the maximum distance.8
When the distance between individual complaints is gradually increased in steps of ten meters (rst
column), the algorithm shows that some complaints within groups of the same category and quarter of
the year are indeed duplicates of other existing posts. For example, when grouping complaints which
are within ten meters of each other, the algorithm indicates that around 16.5 thousand out of around
580,000 complaints are redundant. In relative terms, this amount of excluded complaints equals less then
7In principle, when locating the incident on the map during the reporting process, users can see other open posts in the
same neighborhood and have the possibility to check if a complaint has already been reported.
8A Python procedure for this routine is described by Boeing (2018).
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Note: The example is taken from xmystreet.com/report/1413342.
Figure 3.2: Example Complaint Posted Online on FixMyStreet.com
3% of the initial number of posts.9 When increasing the radius around complaint items, the number of
suspected duplicates increases, albeit at a decreasing rate in absolute amounts. However, even with a
radius of 60 meters around complaints the average cluster size barely exceeds 1.1 complaints per cluster.
Hence, the problem of double-posting does not appear to pose a threat to the validity of the data.
In what follows, I apply a geographic clustering algorithm that uses a maximum of 20 meters as the
threshold for grouping complaints. The threshold value is large enough to eliminate a small number
of obvious complaint duplicates and at the same time small enough not to combine an unreasonable
number of complaints. Within the same cluster of complaints, posts are sorted based on whether they
were resolved within 12 months or less and the rst post is kept in order to provide accurate information
about when the problem was rst reported.
Table 3.2 gives an overview of categories, the number of complaints in each category, as well as
the share of complaints that were solved and how long this took on average. In descending order, the
categories with the largest number of posts are complaints related to ‘Potholes’, ‘Vegetation, Weed and
Hedges’ and ‘Roads and Road Cleaning’. Smaller categories include, for example, ‘Pavement and Foot-
paths’ and ‘Fly-tipping’. On average, over the eight-year time horizon considered here, around 40% of all
complaints are resolved and this process takes less than two months on average. However, considerable
9Complaints without a category, to which the algorithm cannot be applied, are not dropped from the sample in any of the
cases discussed in the table.
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Maximum Distance be- Spatial-Time-Category- Rel. Share of Rem. Average Maximum
tween Complaints (in m) Duplicates Removed Duplicates (in %) Cluster Size Cluster Size
0 0 0.00 1.000 1
10 16 587 2.87 1.031 42
20 26 438 4.58 1.051 43
30 34 008 5.89 1.067 50
40 40 161 6.96 1.080 50
50 45 844 7.94 1.093 52
60 51 096 8.85 1.104 71
Note: Complaints from the same category and the same quarter of the year are grouped together before applying the spatial
clustering algorithm. Complaints with no category assigned are not dropped.
Table 3.1: Data Cleaning for Removal of Duplicate Complaints
dierences between the categories can be observed: for example, relatively complex defects that would
be expected to require more time and materials to x, such as complaints regarding ‘Dangerous Con-
struction’ take considerably more time than comparatively ‘simple’ matters such as removing trash and
dead animals or emptying accumulated waste. Similarly, the proportion of resolved complaints from
these categories is considerably higher.
The geographic distribution of complaints is shown in Figure 3.3, both in terms of absolute counts
(Panel (a)) as well as relative counts per 1000 residents (Panel (b)).10 For virtually all wards in England,
at least one complaint has been posted on the platform between May 2007 and May 2015, except for six
wards which I exclude from the analysis.
0 Posts (6)
 12 Posts (1098)
 25 Posts (1674)
 41 Posts (1507)
 65 Posts (1339)
 105 Posts (1034)
 183 Posts (653)
 365 Posts (266)
 784 Posts (57)
 1418 Posts (26)
 2665 Posts (18)
(a) Absolute Number of Complaints
Missing (667)
 3 Posts (1074)
 5 Posts (1430)
 7 Posts (1400)
 10 Posts (1142)
 15 Posts (895)
 22 Posts (534)
 35 Posts (312)
 57 Posts (119)
 94 Posts (78)
 173 Posts (27)
(b) Relative Number of Complaints (per 1,000 residents)
Figure 3.3: Geographic Distribution of Complaints between May 2007 and May 2015
10Wards for which population data at the ward-level are not available are labeled as “Missing” in Panel (b) of Fig. 3.3.
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Category Complaints Share xed Average Duration until(total #) (in %) xed (in days)
Abandoned Vehicles 12 589 44.99 51.81
Accumulated Litters 4494 49.93 27.26
Bus Stops 1551 34.69 71.50
Car Parking 15 371 18.55 82.52
Dangerous Construction 1009 29.93 102.17
Dead Animals 1070 64.11 13.86
Dog Fouling 13 524 24.03 52.27
Drainage 6651 46.04 64.00
Fly-tipping 38 366 51.50 41.18
Grati 14 436 48.69 52.20
Parks 6982 36.98 64.28
Pavement and Footpaths 50 937 35.79 67.41
Potholes 131 321 42.49 57.46
Roads and Road Cleaning 97 273 33.97 67.14
Rubbish 12 354 59.82 30.44
Trac Lights 7010 44.94 53.57
Vegetation, Weed and Hedges 98 708 48.86 51.26
No Category 36 929 29.31 71.82
Total 550 575 40.80 56.37
Note: Complaints with a duration between the date when reported and the date when labeled as xed of
more than two years are not included in the average duration of the main categories.
Table 3.2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Major Complaint Categories
Over eight years, the average number of complaints within a ward is approximately 31 (or 4.8 per
1000 residents), which I consider suciently large to compute robust quality measures. Some regions,
especially larger or metropolitan regions and cities, have higher absolute and relative complaint counts
per capita than more rural areas, for instance, in the south-west of England.
Following the approach of Dipoppa and Grossman (2020), neighborhood-specic measures of the
quality of local public good provision are based on the council’s responsiveness to online complaints.
Based on detailed information about when complaints were reported on the platform, the time it takes
for the local council to solve the issue is determined for each recorded complaint. I then compute for ev-
ery ward in England the share of complaints that are solved within certain time horizons, ranging from
shorter ones, such as 30 days, to longer ones, such as six months. Obviously, a larger share of complaints
that are solved within a month or even less speaks to a higher responsiveness of local councils, while
a larger proportion of complaints only addressed after a year (or never) indicates poor management
of citizen complaints. Unlike other measures used in the literature, such as self-reported performance
indicators (Carey et al., 2009) or citizens’ assessments of the quality of elected representatives (Clinton
et al., 2004), the proposed indicator has the advantage of being a more objective measure that captures
spatial and temporal variation in the responsivenss of councils responsiveness at a very granular geo-
graphical level for all of England. What is more, resulting measures are highly visible to local voters and
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have the potential to aect their everyday experiences, which is an important determinant of voters’
retrospective evaluation of the council’s work (Popkin, 1994).
The distribution of each quality indicator, computed for all English wards for two four-year windows
between election dates (2007-2011 and 2011-2015), is illustrated in Figure 3.4. Focusing on ve dierent
time horizons, the gure displays boxplots to illustrate the range and the distribution of quality indi-
cators across English neighborhoods, with the median of each distribution highlighted in blue and the
mean in orange in the interquartile range box. The share of complaints that are solved relatively quickly
within one month (rst row) and the share of complaints that are solved only after twelve months or not
at all (last row) show the largest variation among all time horizons considered, as can be readily seen
from the wider interquartile range boxes. In most wards, complaints fall in either category while only
little activity can be documented for the other three time horizons. In most cases, complaints that are
resolved after twelve months or never account for the largest proportion. As indicated by the fact that
the value of the rst quarter of the distribution of this measure is approximately 50%, three quarters of
the neighborhoods in England do not manage to solve half of the reported complaints after one year.
Nevertheless, the distribution is skewed to the left, suggesting that some neighborhoods perform better
than others in this category, with some even solving all requests within twelve months. The results are
closely mirrored by the distribution of the share of complaints resolved within one month. The distribu-
tion has a median of roughly 20% and is skewed to the right. With little repair activity recorded between
one and twelve months, the sum of the fraction of complaints solved either within 30 days, only after
one year, or not at all is fairly close to one for most neighborhoods, thus describing two sides of the
same coin. Given a slightly higher variation in the share of complaints solved only with considerable
delay or never, I stick to this indicator of the quality of local public good provision for the remaining
analysis.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
> 12 months
 or never
6 to 12 months
3 to 6 months
1 to 3 months
 1 month
Note: Horizontal lines in blue and orange denote median and mean of each distribution, respectively.
Figure 3.4: Quality Indicators at the Ward-Level: Fraction of Complaints solved in Dierent Time Horizons
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To provide empirical support for the proposed proxy, Table 3.3 explores how the proposed quality
indicatorQi,t−4 and its sub-components correlate with other observable indicators, particularly in terms
of local-level spending and the number of employees in the public administration. For the pair-wise cor-
relations I use population-weighted averages of of the quality indicator at the level of the local authority
for which other indicators are available as well. Over the same four-year time periods as for the quality
indicators, I compute average spending and divide it by population counts in 2011 and 2015, respec-
tively. The number of public sector employees is expressed per thousand inhabitants of the respective
ward.
As shown in Table 3.3, the suggested quality indicator Qi,t−4 as well as the performance measure in
specic sub-categories are negatively correlated with overall per capita spending of the local adminis-
tration and explicit local council spending on service provision. Although they are smaller in absolute
terms, pair-wise correlations with the number of public sector employees are also negative. As expected,
the correlation table conrms that higher expenditures per inhabitant correlate with smaller, i.e. better,
quality indicators. The correlation is stronger for complaints that fall into the categories ‘roads and
road cleaning’, ‘pavements, footpaths and potholes’ and ‘trac lights’. The fact that the correlation co-
ecients are not larger in absolute magnitude, say above 0.7, is not surprising given that idiosyncratic
shocks at the local level in combination with other district-specic features, such as the eciency of the
organization of the administration, are likely to co-determine the quality of public services and, thus,
the quality indicators. In fact, simply regressing the share of complaints related to potholes, the largest
category in terms of complaint counts, on the district’s spending per capita on services suggests that
more than 15 per cent of the total variation in the quality indicator across neighborhoods and years
can be explained by dierences in expenditures, providing further evidence that the quality indicator,
when aggregated to higher geographic levels, closely aligns with alternative indicators which are not
available at more granular geographic levels.
3.4 Estimation Strategy and Baseline Results
In order to identify the eect of the quality of local public good provision on the re-election chances
of incumbent parties, I rely on variation in the quality of public good provision within spatial units over
time. More specically, I estimate variants of the following two-way xed-eects model
P(Chanдei,t ) = β1Qi,t−4 + β2loд(compl .p.c .i,t−4) + ηi + ηt + γX
e
i,t + ηla,t + ϵi,t
where Qi,t−4 corresponds to the ward-specic quality performance indicators over the four-year time
period prior to the election date in t . To account for time- and local ward-specic characteristics, I
include time and neighborhood xed eects, denoted ηt and ηi , respectively. The relevant outcome
variable is the probability that the current party of the councilor in ward i is voted out of oce and
replaced by another party. For larger wards with multiple councilors potentially from dierent parties,
at least one party must be replaced by another for this to count as a change.11 In the baseline speci-
cations, I focus on party-level outcomes, as opposed to the re-election chances of individual politicians.
11I include only those wards in which there were no elections between 2007 and 2011 and between 2011 and 2015, i.e., I
discard wards that held elections ‘by thirds’ or ‘by halves’.
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Total Spending on # public
spending p.c. all services p.c. sector employees
Qi,t−4
–0.1000 0.0462 –0.0465




















(678, 0.0000) (221, 0.0000) (514, 0.0266)
Qabandoned vehiclesi,t−4
–0.1161 –0.2542 –0.0871










(678, 0.0001) (221, 0.0000) (514, 0.0588)
Note: The data on council-level spending and public sector employment numbers are retrieved
from the Local Government Association. The number of observations based on which pair-wise
correlations are computed and the p-value is shown in brackets below each correlation coecient.
Table 3.3: Pair-wise Correlations of Quality Indicators with Alternative Measures
The reason is that local elections, unless they take place in very closed settings such as schools (Berry
and Howell, 2007), are usually “low-prole, low-cost, and low-information aairs” (Bonneau and Cann,
2015). With little knowledge about the personal characteristics of the incumbent and the opposing can-
didates and their specic programs, voters would likely be guided by their party preferences. I conduct
the analysis again in one of the robustness checks at the individual politician-level. Furthermore, follow-
ing Krebs (1998) and Grossman and Michelitch (2018), I also control for election-specic characteristics
related to competitive pressure, such as the ratio of candidates to available councilor seats and the vote
margin in the last election.12 District-specic time-varying factors which could potentially aect local
voting decisions in neighborhood i are captured by an additional xed-eect ηla,t . These include, for
example, regional unemployment and ination rates, local price levels, crime rates, prevailing coun-
cil party majorities, government formations, party campaign spending, newspaper endorsements and
other district-level trends. What is more, these xed-eects also capture the size of the district council
budget and other budget characteristics, including the allocation to specic expenditure items and the
level of the council tax.
The corresponding regression results are displayed in Table 3.4. Throughout all specications of the
model, we see that an increase in the share of complaints solved only after 12 months or not at all goes
along with an increase of more than eight percentage points in the probability that the incumbent party
is voted out of oce. The results provide compelling evidence that voters reward local politicians for
12It is true that personal characteristics of a politician, e.g. education, experience, age, sex and race, can also play a role. The
Local Government Association regularly censuses among local councilors, but unfortunately the data is not publicly available.
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Dep. variable: P(At least one party loses council seat)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of Complaints xed 0.099** 0.098** 0.097** 0.086* 0.084**
after 12 months or never (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.063) (0.041)
Logarithm of −0.005 −0.010 −0.010 −0.001
Complaints per capita (0.525) (0.459) (0.459) (0.952)
ward FE X X X X X
year FE 8 8 X 8 8
election covariates 8 8 8 X 8
local authority-year FE 8 8 8 8 X
Observations 5630 5630 5630 5190 5630
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. I use clustered standard errors at the level of the local ward.
Corresponding p-values are displayed in brackets below. The coecient of the constant is omitted to ease
readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.4: Baseline Results: The Impact of the Quality of Public Services on Re-election Chances
improving the timely provision of local public services. Including election co-variates or district-year
xed-eects in the regression specication leads to slight, but not statistically signicant, changes in the
coecient estimate. Interestingly, the number of complaints per se does not seem to matter. The point
estimate is both statistically and economically insignicant, suggesting that it is not the occurrence of
a complaint that is important but how the complaint is handled.13
We can also ‘unpack’ the quality indicator and focus on its specic components in order to assess
what matters most to the electorate in local elections. Figure 3.5 shows the coecient estimates from a
two-way xed-eects model, equivalent to model (3) in Table 3.4, when using only the quality indicators
computed for complaints from specic categories. Among the sub-categories for which sucient ob-
servations are available, the largest coecients and the only statistically signicant eects can be found
for ‘dog fouling and y-tipping’ as well as ‘vegetation and hedges’. The eects of the other categories
are not statistically distinguishable from zero.
3.5 Robustness Tests
A series of robustness checks support the baseline results. In the rst column, I focus explicitly on
‘contested wards’, i.e. those neighborhoods in which the councilor had a vote margin of ve percentage
points or less in the 2007 election. The fact that the coecient estimate is three times larger than that in
the baseline results seems to suggest that voters in these wards are much more thorough in examining
the quality of public goods than in uncontested wards. The number of complaints per capita remains
irrelevant to the probability of re-election.
One might also assume that voters are to some degree aected by the quality of public good provision
in adjacent neighborhoods. For example, poor provision of public goods in nearby neighborhoods could
13When altering the specic form of the regressor, such as the logarithm of the number of complaints or complaints per
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Figure 3.5: The Impact of the Quality of Services of Sub-Categories on Re-election Chances
potentially contribute to a general feeling of dissatisfaction among constituents about the eciency of
the work of local representatives, regardless of the actual quality of public good provision in their own
neighborhood. With this in mind, it makes sense to extend the baseline specication to include spatially
lagged regressors that control for the quality indicators in the direct neighborhood of ward i . Following
Dubin (1998), I extend the specication as follows,
P(Chanдei,t ) = β Qi,t−4 + ρ
∑
j
wi, jQ j,t−4 + β2loд(compl .p.c .i,t−4) + ηi + ηt + ϵi,t ,
with wi, j being the ij-th cell of a spatial weights matrix W and Q j,t−4 being the quality performance
of neighborhood j , i . The matrix W assigns non-zero values if neighborhood j shares a border (of
unspecied length) with neighborhood i . Row values are standardized by the number of geographic
neighbors of i , so that the additional regressor
∑
j wi, jQ j,t−4 corresponds to the average quality indicator
in direct neighborhoods of ward i .14 Including the average quality indicator of direct neighbors of i does
not alter the previous results, suggesting that spatial spill-over eects from surrounding neighborhoods
are not relevant for the eect of the quality of local services in neighborhood i .
Similarly, as an alternative functional specication, the logit regression with unit and year xed
eects conrms the sign and signicance of both the quality indicator and the complaints per capita.
In the last column, I move from the party-level to the individual politician-level and model the
probability of an incumbent politician being voted out of oce as a function of the quality indicator in
his or her constituency since the last election. Including xed-eects for each politician, the analysis
is restricted to those who served as councilor for a specic neighborhood and were up for re-election
in the subsequent election four years later. In total, this applies to 9020 politicians. The results of
the regressions are remarkably similar to those at the party-level. While the number of complaints is
14Some English neighborhoods in the East share borders with Wales and others in the North share borders with Scot-
land. When computing the average performances in the neighborhood of i , the quality of public good provision in these
neighborhoods outside of England is not considered.
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virtually irrelevant, the share of complaints resolved within 12 months or thereafter is an important
determinant of politicians’ re-election chances.15
Dep. variable: P(At least one party loses council seat)
Contested Wards Spatial auto-corr. Logit Model Politician-Level
Share of Complaints 0.331*** 0.090** 0.711** 0.040**
xed after 12 mon’s/never (0.002) (0.025) (0.018) (0.037)
Logarithm of −0.030 −0.006 −0.073 0.001
Complaints per capita (0.346) (0.491) (0.439) (0.919)
unit & year FE X X X X
Observations 1576 5576 1160 9020
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. I use clustered standard errors at the level of the local authority and the level
of the individual politician, respectively. Corresponding p-values are displayed in brackets below. The coecient of the
constant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.5: Robustness Checks: The Impact of the Quality of Public Services on Re-election Chances
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the link between the quality of local public services and the chances of
incumbent parties to be re-elected in local elections. Finding a suitable metric for the quality of public
good provision at a granular level that captures dierences in the quality of public good provision across
spatial units and time has been a shortcoming of previous studies, limiting both the internal and external
validity of the results. I use 550,000 complaints from the online platform FixMyStreet.com that were
submitted between May 2007 and May 2015, the dates of major local elections in the UK, to derive
indicators for all 7500 wards in England, the most granular geographic level in the UK. I focus on the
share of complaints that were resolved only after 12 months or never, with larger shares indicating
poorer provision of public services. At the district-level, the next level up in the geographic structure of
the United Kingdom, the indicator correlates negatively with various expenditure items of local councils
and the number of employees in the public sector.
The results provide compelling evidence that in wards where public services are of poorer quality,
i.e. wards with a large fraction of unresolved complaints, the chances of the incumbent parties to be re-
elected in 2011 and 2015 are about nine percentage points smaller. The results are robust to various xed-
eects specications and the inclusion of election-specic co-variates at the ward-level. The timely
removal of dog waste and y-tipping appear to be particularly important to voters. Interestingly, the
number of complaints per capita in each ward does not inuence re-election probabilities, suggesting
that what matters in evaluating the work of the councilor is not the incident of a complaint per se but
how it is handled.
15Including xed eects for the party that the councilor is aliated with (or whether he/she is without party aliation)




The Tax-Elasticity of Corporate Prots under Formula Ap-
portionment
This chapter is based on joint work with
Clemens Fuest and Florian Neumeier.
4.1 Introduction
The international system of corporate taxation is under tremendous pressure. Calls for a substantial
reform are coming from national governments as well as international organizations, and they are get-
ting louder. One of the main points of criticism is that the current system fails to ensure that corporate
prots are taxed where value is created. A series of recent leaks indicates that multi-jurisdictional en-
terprises (MJEs) exploit inconsistencies between national tax rules and loopholes in existing regulations
in order to shift prots to jurisdictions where they are taxed at low rates or, in some cases, not at all.
The process of digitization, allowing rms to serve markets without physical presence, as well as MJEs’
increasing reliance on intangible assets have aggravated this issue. The strategic location of intangibles,
such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, is believed to be one of the main channels through which
MJEs shift prots (see Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017, and OECD, 2018, on this topic).
The vulnerability of the international tax system to MJEs’ prot shifting and tax avoidance strategies
is related to its design. The current system is based on separate accounting (SA), meaning that taxable
prots are calculated separately for each jurisdiction in which an MJE operates. Since the denition
of ‘taxable prots’ varies across jurisdictions, MJEs have an incentive to organize their international
activities as to minimize their overall tax burden. Moreover, under SA, the valuation of cross-border
transactions between aliates of the same MJE group bears great importance for the distribution of
prots. The arm’s length principle (ALP), which is supposed to ensure that prices for intra-rm trans-
actions reect market values, has severe limitations, since many goods and services that are exchanged
between aliates belonging to the same MJE group are hard, if not impossible, to value. This makes the
valuation of intra-rm transactions prone to manipulation and therefore oers considerable scope for
prot shifting.
Many policy-makers and economists see the solution to these problems in a change from SA to a
system of formula apportionment (FA). Under FA, the accounts of an MJE’s aliates are consolidated and
then divided among the jurisdictions in which the MJE operates based on one (or a list) of apportionment
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factors that measure economic activity in the jurisdictions, such as, for instance, payroll costs, asset
values, and sales. The jurisdictions can then apply their own tax rates to determine the corresponding
tax liability. The consolidation of prots and the formulaic apportionment of the tax base would – at
least in theory – resolve any inconsistencies between national tax regulations and make the valuation
of intra-rm transactions superuous. Thus, it would be ensured that corporate prots are taxed where
they are generated.
In light of its potential benets, the European Commission proposed adopting an EU-wide FA regime
in 2001 (European Commission, 2001). The initial proposal was adapted and rened in subsequent years
(European Commission, 2011, 2015). According to this proposal, the prots of companies with cross-
border activities within the EU would be consolidated at the EU-level, creating a so-called common
consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB). The CCCTB would then be distributed among EU member
states on the basis of three apportionment factors: assets, labor (payroll and number of employees), and
sales. Thus far, though, FA regimes are only found at the sub-national level. Examples include Canada,
Japan, Germany, and the US.
However, the adoption of FA may have downsides as well. McLure Jr (1981) as well as Gordon
and Wilson (1986) highlight that under FA, the corporate tax eectively becomes a tax levied on the
apportionment factors, and that tax rate dierences may distort the allocation of these factors across
jurisdictions. This, in turn, also aects the distribution of prots. Simply speaking, under FA, MJEs have
an incentive to relocate apportionment factors to low-tax jurisdictions in order to minimize their tax
burden, while under SA, they may only shift paper prots by exploiting gaps in national tax legislation.
Despite this insight, existing studies estimating the corporate tax revenue eects of an introduction of
FA on a global scale (e.g., Cobham and Loretz, 2014), in the EU (e.g., Devereux and Loretz, 2008; Fuest
et al., 2007), or unilaterally by the US (e.g., Clausing and Lahav, 2011; Shackelford and Slemrod, 1998)
ignore potential behavioral responses of MJEs to corporate tax rate dierences.
So far, empirical evidence on the consequences of tax rate dierences for the distribution of MJEs’
prots and apportionment factors under FA is scarce. This study aims at lling this gap by using rm-
level data from Germany. In Germany, prots are taxed both at the federal level and at the local level.
The local business tax is levied by the municipalities, which can set their tax rates independently. Local
business taxation takes place in the form of an FA regime. The prots of rms with entities in multiple
municipalities are consolidated at the national level before being divided between municipalities that
host entities of an MJE based on the relative payroll share. Consequently, in our analysis, we focus on
the tax sensitivity of MJEs’ prots and payroll costs. The data that we employ is provided by German
tax authorities through the Federal Statistical Oce (local business tax statistics; Gewerbesteuerstatis-
tik). It covers the universe of German rms and allows us to identify which rms operate in multiple
municipalities as well as how prots and payroll costs are distributed between host municipalities. Our
sample covers the years from 2010 to 2014 and includes roughly 170,000 MJEs per year. A unique tax
identication number for each rm allows us to link the data to a panel. While the denition of the
tax base is uniform across all municipalities, local business tax rates vary notably both across time and
space, which makes Germany particularly well-suited to study the behavioral responses of MJEs to tax
rate dierences under FA.
Our results provide compelling evidence for a strong response of MJEs to local tax rate changes. In
particular, it is found that the tax semi-elasticity of MJEs’ prots is approximately −1.2 per cent, that is
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an increase in the LBT by ten percentage points would lead, ceteris paribus, to a decline of local taxable
prots of twelve per cent. A high sensitivity of rms to cross-jurisdictional tax rate dierentials raise
strong concerns about the eectiveness of a FA regime to curb the extent of prot shifting by MJEs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief review of the existing
literature on the extent of prot shifting activities under FA, followed by a description of the local
corporate tax system in Germany in Section 4.3. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 introduce the data we use for this
analysis and the empirical approach. Main results follow in Section 4.6 together with a breakdown of
the response by industries in Section 4.7. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
While prot shifting under SA has been studied extensively (see Beer et al., 2020; Dharmapala, 2014;
Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017), empirical evidence on the tax-sensitivity of prots and apportionment
factors in FA regimes is scarce. Most of the existing empirical studies focus on the US, where FA is used
to divide MJEs’ domestic prots between states. An interesting feature of the US case is that the states
cannot only choose corporate income tax (CIT) rates autonomously, but also the weights they apply to
the specic factors in the apportionment formula, namely payroll, assets, and sales. The implicit tax
levied on the apportionment factors through the formulaic approach can thus be manipulated by US
states by either changing the CIT rate or the formula weights. Results of dierent studies are conict-
ing, though. Weiner (1994) nds that manufacturing sales in a state are inversely related to the implicit
tax on sales. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) provide similar evidence regarding employment. In con-
trast, Klassen and Laplante (2012) report that employment and assets are insensitive to changes in the
respective formula weights and/or CIT rates. Clausing (2016) analyzes the sensitivity of investment,
employment, and sales with respect to changes in formula weights and/or CIT rates, but does not nd a
(robust) signicant association. A disadvantage of these studies is that they use data aggregated at the
state-level. Due to that, the dependent variables employed in the analyses capture the activities of both
MJEs and single-jurisdictional enterprises (SJEs). The results therefore do not allow any conclusions to
be drawn with regard to the tax sensitivity of MJEs’ prots or the distribution of apportionment factors.
In contrast, Mintz and Smart (2004) draw on Canadian data allowing them to dierentiate between
two types of rms: MJEs operating in multiple provinces through a single corporate entity and MJEs
operating through separate subsidiaries. While the former rm type is subject to FA, the prots of the
latter type are taxed according to SA rules. The authors nd that the prots of MJEs operating in an FA
regime are considerably less sensitive to CIT rates than the prots of MJEs preparing separate accounts.
However, the data Mintz and Smart (2004) use are aggregated across all rms of the same type at the
province-level. One of the advantages of using rm-level data, as we do in the present paper, is that it
allows taking the level of taxation in other jurisdictions hosting entities of an MJE into account. This is
important since theoretical models suggest that distortions in the allocation of apportionment factors
are caused by tax rate dierences between host jurisdictions. While rm-level data allow assessing the
sensitivity of prots and apportionment factors to such tax rate dierences, studies based on aggregate
data only take local tax rate levels into account.
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To the best of our knowledge, the only study with a focus on Germany is Riedel (2010).1 Despite
using the same data source, the are several important dierences between her paper and ours: rst,
Riedel (2010) assesses the tax-sensitivity of the payroll-to-capital ratio, whereas our focus is on prots
and payroll.2 Second, her data only cover two years with a time gap in between: 1998 and 2001. Conse-
quently, her estimates of the tax sensitivity of the payroll-to-capital ratio is based on tax rate changes
that potentially occurred at dierent points in time in between the two sample years, making it di-
cult to distinguish between short and medium-run eects. Moreover, a nationwide unique identier for
MJEs, their subsidiaries, and permanent establishments only became available in the local business tax
statistics in 2001. Before 2001, the data only included an identier provided by the host municipalities.
As a result, entities that relocated from one municipality to another were assigned a new identier.
What is more, some municipalities even assigned an entity a new identier in case it relocated within
the municipality. Riedel’s decision not to use information on entities that cannot be linked across the
two sample years results in a loss of 80 per cent of observations. Thus, her sample is considerably smaller
than ours (and selection into the sample may be endogenous). Third, we test whether the tax-sensitivity
of prots and payroll varies across industries, which is not done by Riedel (2010).
4.3 Business Taxation in Germany
In Germany, business prots are taxed at two levels. At the national level, depending on a rm’s
legal status, prots are either subject to the CIT (applies to corporate rms) or the personal income
tax (PIT; applies to non-corporate rms). While the CIT is characterized by a uniform rate of 15 per
cent, the PIT is progressive, with an initial rate of 14 per cent and a maximum rate of 45 per cent. At
the municipality-level, the prots of both corporate and non-corporate rms are subject to the local
business tax (LBT).
A rm’s LBT liability is the product of three factors: the tax base, the federal basic factor (Steuer-
messzahl), and the local scaling factor (Hebesatz). The LBT rate is thus equal to the national basic factor
times the local scaling factor. Both the tax base and the basic factor are determined at the federal level.
They are uniform across municipalities and cannot be changed by them. Since 2008, the basic factor is
equal to 3.5 per cent (before: 5.0 per cent). In contrast, municipalities can set the local scaling factor
autonomously.3 Figure 4.1 illustrates that the scaling factor exhibits a considerable degree of variation,
both across municipalities (left panel) and within municipalities over time (right panel). In 2014, the
last year of our sample, it ranged from 200 per cent to 900 per cent, with an average of 354 per cent.
This implies an average LBT rate of 12.39 per cent (= 3.5% × 354%) and a range from 7.0 per cent to 31.5
per cent. 56 per cent of the municipalities changed their scaling factor at least once during the sample
period, and three per cent changed it in every sample year. Of all scaling factor changes covered in our
sample, 97 per cent were hikes and only three per cent were cuts.
1Buettner et al. (2011) use data from Germany to analyze whether tax rate dierences across municipalities aect MJEs’
choice to integrate legally independent entities in case the costs associated with remaining disintegrated are reduced.
2The choice of the dependent variable in Riedel (2010) is motivated by a theoretical model indicating that FA distorts both
labor and capital demand. Unfortunately, though, information on capital investment is not available in the local business tax
statistics anymore.
3The multiplier must be at least 200 per cent.
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(b) Scaling factor changes between 2010 and 2014
Figure 4.1: Local Scaling Factors in Germany
Firms with entities in more than one municipality are subject to formula apportionment: the prots
of all entities are consolidated at the national level in order to create a common tax base. Consolidated
prots are then apportioned across municipalities in which the company operates based on the entities’
payroll shares.4 An entity’s payroll costs include the salaries, wages, and other compensations paid to
persons formally employed at the entity, but exclude compensations for apprentices and interns (§31
Local Business Tax Law/Gewerbesteuergesetz).
4.4 Data
The analysis is based on administrative data provided by the German tax authorities through the Sta-
tistical Oces of the States. The data comprise information from the tax returns of all German rms that
are subject to the local business tax (Gewerbesteuerstatistik). The units of observations are municipality-
rm-years, i.e., the information is aggregated across all of a rm’s entities (including the headquarter,
subsidiaries, and permanent establishments) located in a municipality in case of multiple aliates in
the same municipality. Our data set covers the years from 2010 to 2014 and includes approximately four
million observations per year. A rich set of accounting information is available at the rm-municipality
level for every year, including the tax base, i.e., the prots of the company which are apportioned to
a specic municipality, the payroll costs, the main industry of the rm, its specic legal status as well
as the LBT rate. Furthermore, the data set contains a unique tax identication number that is uniform
across all municipalities in which the company operates and over time (Steueridentikationsnummer).




The tax return data have several important advantages over other, mostly commercial data sets,
such as the Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis and Amadeus data. First, Orbis and Amadeus report ownership
information only for the most up to date version of the available data. This creates the possibility of
misclassication of ownership structures in case of changes to the ownership, for example in case of
company take-overs or mergers. Second, other available data sets typically report nancial statement
information rather than tax return information. This distinction is important, even though it is reason-
able to assume that most countries achieve a satisfying degree of book-tax conformity. Third, and most
important for our research question, the Orbis and Amadeus data sets often have a limited coverage of
aliates in countries with particularly generous tax-favoring conditions (‘tax havens’), thus providing
only an incomplete picture (see Tørsløv et al., 2018, on this issue). The tax return data used here provide
information on all municipalities in Germany in which the company operates through aliates.
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in our analysis are shown in Table 4.1. Between 2010
and 2014, the average local scaling factor across all municipalities in which entities of MJEs were located
was approximately 383 per cent, which translates into an average (statutory) LBT rate of 13.4 per cent.
However, there is considerable variation with respect to the local scaling factor and the resulting LBT
rate as can be seen from the fact that the dierence between the scaling factor’s 5th and 95th percentiles
is almost 200 percentage points (300 per cent vs. 475 per cent). The tax rate dierence between the
entities of MJE in one municipality and the average tax rate in other municipalities in which the MJE
has aliates is centered around 0 and varies between −3 and 3 percentage points. The median of the
apportioned tax base and payroll costs per year and municipality are roughly 860 Euro and 0.6 million
Euro, respectively. Large standard deviations in both cases as well as substantially larger sample means
indicate that there are outliers at the top of the distributions, for which we account in a robustness test
by trimming the bottom and the top percentile of both variables.
5th Perc. Mean Median 95th Perc. St. Dev.
Local Scaling Factor (in %) 300.00 383.33 380.00 475.00 53.19
LBT Rate (in %) 10.50 13.42 13.30 16.63 1.86
LBT Di. to other Group Entities (in pp.) −2.91 0.03 0.00 3.09 1.89
App. Tax Base (only pos., in Euro) 42.00 6222.87 861.00 13 933.00 132903
Payroll Costs (only pos., in Mio. Euro) 0.01 6.98×108 0.59 945.00 8.31×1011
Source: Local business tax statistics.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Multi-Jurisdictional Entities
4.5 Empirical Approach
To estimate the sensitivity of MJEs’ prots and payroll costs with regard to LBT rates, we follow the
existing prot shifting literature (see Beer et al., 2020, and Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017) and adopt
a modied version of empirical model proposed by Hines and Rice (1994):
yi,m,t = β0 + β1(τm,t − τ i,−m,t ) + ϕi,m + ϕt + εi,m,t (4.1)
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where i refers to the MJE,m to the municipality, and t to the year. The dependent variableyi,m,t is either
the logarithm of the tax base (Steuermessbetrag) or the payroll costs of MJE i in municipalitym and year
t . The main explanatory variable of interest is τm,t − τ i,−m,t , which denotes the dierence between the
LBT rate of municipality m and the average LBT rate of all other municipalities in which MJE i has
entities. An increase in municipalitym’s scaling factor would lead, ceteris paribus, to an increase in the
LBT rate dierential and, thus, increases MJE i’s incentive to shift prots out of municipality m. We
thus expect the coecient estimate β1 to be negative in case MJEs are responsive to changes in the LBT
rate.
In the prot shifting literature, it is common to control for dierent rm characteristics as well as
variables that depict the economic, demographic, and political situation in a jurisdiction. However, since
the choice of covariates tends to be arbitrary, we instead add a comprehensive set of xed-eects to our
empirical model. To check the sensitivity of our results with respect to modications to our empirical
model, we estimate three specications that dier regarding the set of xed-eects that we include.
All three specications include MJE-municipality xed-eects, which account for any (time-invariant)
characteristics of the MJE i’s entities located in municipality m. In the rst specication, we add year
xed-eects, which account for changes in economic conditions, such as business cycle uctuations,
at the national level. In the second specication, we replace the year xed-eects with year-district
xed-eects, thus allowing economic uctuations to vary across regions. Since there are 401 districts
in Germany, this specication allows us to control for changes in economic conditions at a granular
regional level. In the third specication, the year xed-eects are replaced by year-district-industry
xed-eects, thus allowing economic uctuations to vary not only at the regional level, but also across
industries within regions.
4.6 Results
The estimation results for Equation 4.1 are shown in Table 4.2. The left panel shows the estimates
when using the tax base as the dependent variable, the right panel when using payroll costs.
Our results indicate a statistically and economically signicant relationship between the tax rate
dierential and the tax base. An increase in the LBT rate dierential by one percentage point is associ-
ated with a decrease in the tax base by roughly 1.2 per cent. The estimated semi-elasticity is remarkably
robust across the three specications of our empirical model. Interestingly, our estimates are some-
what larger (in absolute terms) than the average semi-elasticities reported by Beer et al. (2020) as well
as Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017). Their estimates are based on meta-analyses of the literature on
cross-country prot shifting under SA. Beer et al. (2020) nd an average tax semi-elasticity of corporate
prots of −1.0, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) of −0.8. Against this background, our nding may be
interpreted as evidence that FA does not reduce prot shifting activities.
The estimated tax semi-elasticity of payroll costs is even larger than the semi-elasticity of the tax
base. According to our estimates, a one percentage point increase in the tax rate dierential is associated
with a decrease in payroll costs of 3.1 per cent. The fact that the magnitude of the estimated tax semi-
elasticity is around three times larger for the payroll costs than for the tax base suggests that jobs are not
relocated to entities located in another municipality, in which case the two tax semi-elasticities would
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be of similar size. Instead, it appears that local payroll costs are reduced without an equivalent increase
of payroll costs elsewhere.
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 4.1 indicate that the sample distribution of the tax base
and payroll costs is heavily skewed in the sense that there are few rms with tax bases and payroll costs
that are far larger than the sample means. To check the robustness of our results with regard to these
outliers, we repeat the analysis based on trimmed data where we discard the smallest and largest one
per cent of observations in terms of tax bases and payroll costs. However, our results remain virtually
unchanged (Table B.1).
Dep. variable: Log(Tax Basei,m,t ) Dep. variable: Log(Payrolli,m,t )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τm,t − τ i,−m,t
−1.236*** −1.175*** −1.108*** −8.779*** −3.118*** −3.112***
(0.258) (0.273) (0.274) (1.900) (0.419) (0.420)
Aliate FEs X X X X X X
Year FEs X 8 8 X 8 8
District-Year FEs 8 X 8 8 X 8
District-Year-Ind. FEs 8 8 X 8 8 X
Observations 955,277 955,275 954,055 1,356,317 1,356,315 1,355,622
R
2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.79 0.84 0.85
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use heteroskedasticity robust standard errors which are displayed in
brackets below. The coecient of the constant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.2: The Eect of Tax Rate Dierentials on Tax Base and Payroll Costs of Aliates of MJEs
4.7 Prot Shifting Responses by Industries
Our results indicate that the local reduction of payroll costs in response to a LBT rate hike is not
compensated by an increase in payroll elsewhere. Instead, the reduction in local payroll costs apparently
leads to a reduction in the MJE’s overall payroll costs. In principle, there are two ways to reduce payroll
costs. A rm can either cut the wages of its employees or reduce the level of employment, implying that
either employees are laid o or working hours are reduced.
However, it seems unlikely that our results are driven by wage cuts, since nominal wages tend to
be rigid, at least in the short-run. Moreover, nominal wages are specied in the working contract and
changes to the contract require the agreement of the employee. Supporting this notion, Fuest et al.
(2018) study the incidence of the German LBT on real wages and nd that LBT rate hikes lead to a
signicant real wage decline only after two years. They argue that this eect most likely comes from a
slower nominal wage growth.
What about the level of employment then? In principle, employees can be laid o at short notice.
For instance, the legal period of notice is one month for employees who have been employed at the
company for a maximum of ve years, four months for employees who have been with the company
for a maximum of ten years, and seven months for employees who have been with the company for a
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maximum of 20 years. However, in practice, laying o employees turns out to be more dicult, as the
works council can object to a dismissal.
Percentage of Respondents ...
Industry Paid by the Hour with Mini-Jobs with Paid Overtime
Art/entertainment 10.47 18.42 5.45
Catering/lodging 32.94 29.94 10.26
Construction 46.45 5.36 15.36
Education 4.56 10.57 4.70
Finance 0.65 3.91 9.54
Health care 9.42 11.52 10.02
IT 3.35 5.40 7.89
Manufacturing 43.39 4.69 16.60
Other business services 46.52 28.73 12.39
Other services 15.94 15.89 6.52
Property 9.76 12.40 4.28
Scient./techn. services 2.28 8.74 7.16
Trade 22.00 20.76 12.58
Transport 39.99 13.15 15.11
Water and waste 38.42 4.95 14.69
Source: Own calculations based on data from Socio-Economic Panel (v.34).
Table 4.3: Dierences in the Prevalence of Payment by Hours, Mini-Jobs, and Paid Overtime by Industry
An easier way for a company to reduce the level of employment is to reduce working hours. In prin-
ciple, there are two types of employees: those who receive a xed remuneration each month (Angestell-
te/Gehaltsbezieher) and those who are paid by the hour (Arbeiter/Lohnbezieher). The latter group typi-
cally comprises low-skilled workers as well as so-called ‘mini-jobbers’, that is, persons who work part-
time and earn less than 450 Euro per month (400 Euro before 2013). If the working hours of paid-by-
the-hour workers and ‘mini-jobbers’ are reduced, payroll costs decrease as well. Moreover, the payroll
costs relevant for the apportionment of the tax base under FA also include compensations for working
overtime. Reducing overtime work thus represents another possible way of reducing payroll costs.
Unfortunately, our data do not include any information about the relevant components of payroll
costs. However, as Table 4.3 shows, there is notable variation in the prevalence of workers paid by
the hour and paid overtime work across industries. On these grounds, we estimate separate tax semi-
elasticities by industries. The coecient estimates are illustrated graphically in Figure 4.2.5
The results suggest that there are substantial dierences between industries regarding the tax-
sensitivity of the tax base and payroll costs. Turning to the tax base, we obtain particularly large esti-
mates in the ‘Transport’, ‘Finance’, and ‘IT’ sector (although the latter eect is insignicant). In line with
our conjecture, the ‘Transport’ sector is characterized by a relatively high share of paid-by-the-hour and
paid overtime workers. This is not true, though, for the ‘Finance’ and ‘IT’ sector. In contrast the esti-
mated tax semi-elasticities for ‘Manufacturing’, ‘Scientic and Technical Services’, and ‘Other Business
Services’ are smaller than the baseline estimate and insignicant. However, at least in ‘Manufacturing’
5Note that the Figure only includes the results for industries with at least 35,000 observations. The results for all industries
can be found in Figure B.1 in the Appendix.
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and ‘Other Business Services’, the share of paid-by-the-hour workers is particularly large. All in all, our
ndings are thus inconclusive regarding the potential channels through which local payroll costs are
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Note: The point estimates for each industry are obtained from the same specication as Table 4.2, columns (2) and (5).
Figure 4.2: The Extent of Tax Base and Payroll Cost Responses to Tax Rate Dierentials for the Largest
Industries
4.8 Conclusion
The international system of corporate taxation is often considered to be a relic of the ‘brick and
mortar’ economy and not to be t for our modern, highly globalized, and digitalized world, as it does
not ensure that prots are taxed where value is created. In light of this criticism, many policy-makers
and economic scholars advocate for a change from the current system of separate accounting (SA) to a
formula apportionment (FA) regime. The general hope is that under FA, the international distribution
of prots may better reect the distribution of economic activity instead of being a result of multi-
jurisdictional enterprises (MJEs) aiming at minimizing their tax burden.
However, one aspect that is often ignored is that under FA, the existence of tax dierentials across
jurisdictions may lead to a distortion in the distribution of apportionment factors. That is, under FA,
MJEs have an incentive to relocate economic activities to low-tax jurisdictions, whereas under SA, prots
are merely shifted on paper.
Our results indicate that the introduction of FA is not an eective measure to reduce prot shifting
by MJEs. Utilizing data from Germany, where FA is applied at the local level and apportionment is based
on relative payroll shares, we obtain an estimate for the tax semi-elasticity of MJEs’ prots of −1.2 per
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cent, indicating that MJEs are very sensitive to tax rate dierentials under FA. Moreover, we nd that
the distortions in the distribution of apportionment factors under FA can be large: the corresponding








A.1 Details about National Fiscal Rules of Treated Countries
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Country Year of Num. Target Coverage Included inAdoption (% of GDP) of FR baseline sample
Antigua and Barbuda 1998 −3 GG no, < 1 million population in 2018
Argentina 2000 0 GG Yes
Austria 1995 −3 GG Yes
Belgium 1992 −3 GG Yes
Benin 2000 −3 CG Yes
Bulgaria 2006 −2 GG Yes
Burkina Faso 2000 −3 CG Yes
Cabo Verde 1998 −3 CG no, < 1 million population in 2018
Cameroon 2002 0 CG no, missing balance data
Canada 1998 0 CG Yes
Central African Republic 2002 0 CG Yes
Chad 2002 0 CG no, missing balance data
Congo, Republic of 2002 0 CG Yes
Croatia 2013 −3 GG Yes
Cyprus 2004 −3 GG no, < 1 million population in 2018
Czech Republic 2004 −3 GG Yes
Côte d’Ivoire 2000 −3 CG Yes
Denmark 1992 −3 GG Yes
Dominica 1998 −3 GG no, < 1 million population in 2018
Equatorial Guinea 2002 0 CG Yes
Estonia 1993 −3 GG no, missing balance data
Finland 1995 −3 GG Yes
France 1992 −3 GG Yes
Gabon 2002 0 CG Yes
Georgia 2014 −3 CG Yes
Germany 1992 −3 GG Yes
Greece 1992 −3 GG Yes
Grenada 1998 −3 GG no, < 1 million population in 2018
Guinea-Bissau 2000 −3 CG Yes
Hong Kong SAR 1997 0 GG Yes
Hungary 2004 −3 GG Yes
India 2008 −3 GG no, FR was only for 1 year in place
Indonesia 1980 −3 GG no, FR already in place since 1967
Ireland 1992 −3 GG Yes
Israel 2007 varying CG Yes
Italy 1992 −3 GG Yes
Kosovo 2013 2 GG Yes
Latvia 2004 −3 GG Yes
Lithuania 2004 −3 GG Yes
Luxembourg 1992 −3 GG no, < 1 million population in 2018
Mali 2000 −3 CG no, lack of scal balance data
Malta 2004 −3 GG no, < 1 million population in 2018
Mexico 2006 0 CG Yes
Montenegro, Rep. of 2014 −3 CG no, < 1 million population in 2018
Netherlands 1992 −3 GG Yes
Niger 2000 −3 CG Yes
Nigeria 2007 −3 CG Yes
Pakistan 2008 0 CG Yes
Paraguay 2015 −1.5 CG Yes
Peru 2000 -2/-1.5 CG Yes
Poland 2004 −3 GG Yes
Portugal 1992 −3 GG Yes
Romania 2007 −3 GG Yes
Senegal 2000 −3 CG Yes
Singapore 1980 0 CG no, FR already in place since 1962
Slovak Republic 2004 −3 GG Yes
Slovenia 2004 −3 GG Yes
Spain 1992 −3 GG Yes
St. Kitts and Nevis 1998 −3 GG no, < 1 million population in 2018
St. Lucia 1998 −3 GG no, < 1 million population in 2018
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1998 −3 GG no, < 1 million population in 2018
Sweden 1995 1 GG Yes
Togo 2000 −3 CG Yes
United Kingdom 1992 −3 GG Yes
Source: IMF Fiscal Rules Database.
Table A.1: Countries included in the Sample and their National Fiscal Rules
Appendix A. Details: Chapter 1




























































































































































































































Note: The matrix displays countries with scal rules on the horizontal axis and donor countries on the vertical axis. Assigned
weights obtained from the baseline SC specication are shown in the corresponding cells of the matrix with larger weights in
darker red. Cells in white indicate zero weights.
Figure A.1: Matrix of Donor Weights for Baseline SC Specication
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Years since treatment
95% Confidence Interval Point Estimate
Note: The plot displays the average treatment eect as obtained from a linear combination of country-specic treatment eects
from the baseline SC specication and Equ. 1.3. The scal rule is introduced in year 0.
Figure A.2: Average Treatment Eect of the Fiscal Rule on Governments’ Balances
83










-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Years since treatment
p10 and p90: Actual p10 and p90: Counterfactual
Note: The time series depict the 10th and the 90th percentiles of the actual budget balance series and the counter-factual
balance series as obtained from the baseline SC specication. The scal rule is introduced in year 0.
Figure A.3: Time Paths of the 10th and the 90th Percentiles of the Treated and Counter-factual Balances
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Centered Counter-factual Balance
Individual effects, linear fit Average treatment effect
Note: The scatter plot depicts the individual treatment eects by level of counter-factual budget balance as obtained from a
SC estimation based on economic covariates instead of lagged outcome variables of the budget balance. The counter-factual
balance on the horizontal axis is centered around the numerical value of the scal rule in each country.
Figure A.4: Individual Treatment Eects by Level of Counter-factual Government Balance from Estimation
based on Covariates
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95% Confidence Interval Point Estimate
Note: The gure displays the average treatment eect as obtained from a linear combination of country-specic treatment
eects from the SC specication based on covariates and Equ. 1.3. The scal rule is introduced in year 0.
Figure A.5: Average Treatment Eects of Fiscal Rule Introduction from Estimation based on Covariates
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Centered Counter-factual Balance
Individual effects, linear fit Average treatment effect
Note: The gure depicts the individual treatment eects by level of the counter-factual budget balance as obtained from a SC
specication with only ve years of pre- and post-treatment windows. The income lter according to which only countries
in the same or adjacent income groups are matched with each other is kept.
Figure A.6: Individual Treatment Eects by Level of Counter-factual Government Balance with Shortened





B.1 Robustness Check for Trimmed Data
Dep. variable: Log(Tax Basei,m,t ) Dep. variable: Log(Payrolli,m,t )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τm,t − τ i,−m,t
−1.132*** −1.058*** −0.998*** −8.659*** −3.150*** −3.160***
(0.266) (0.273) (0.274) (1.832) (0.426) (0.425)
Aliate FEs X X X X X X
Year FEs X 8 8 X 8 8
District-Year FEs 8 X 8 8 X 8
District-Year-Ind. FEs 8 8 X 8 8 X
Observations 894,212 894,212 892,960 1,335,731 1,335,731 1,335,022
R
2 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.79 0.84 0.84
Note: Results are based on OLS estimation. We use heteroskedasticity robust standard errors which are displayed in
brackets below. The coecient of the constant is omitted to ease readability.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Note: The point estimates for each industry are obtained from the same specication as Table 4.2, columns (2) and (5).
Figure B.1: The Extent of Tax Base and Payroll Cost Responses to Tax Rate Dierentials for all Industries
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